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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on development economics. The
first essay estimates the effect of bullying on dropping out of school. I find that
boys experience higher rates of bullying than girls, but bullying affects only girls’
probability of dropping out of school. The second essay investigates the accuracy
of information regarding assets collected through household surveys. Using a survey
that asks questions regarding household assets to the wife and to the husband from
families participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA,
I find discrepancies between the spouses in the possession of assets reported. The
third essay analyzes the use of disaster funds (government saving resources ex-ante
for post-disaster use) to protect families consumption from a natural disaster. Using
data for Hurricane Earl in Puebla, Mexico, where a disaster fund was implemented;
results show a decrease in consumption, including beans, which is an essential staple
good for Mexican families.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on development economics. The
first essay (Chapter 2), “Girls vs. Boys: Who is Dropping Out of School Because of
Bullying?”, estimates the effect of bullying on dropping out of school. Despite the
rising interest in bullying, there is little evidence about its effects on dropout rates.
Furthermore, the limited evidence suffers from serious problems of omitted variable
bias. A random experiment is impossible to conduct and the literature has found
problems to identify an instrumental variable. To address the problem of omitted
variable bias, I implement two novel bounding econometric techniques: one proposed
by Oster (2016) and the other by Krauth (2016). By using these methodologies and
data from adolescents participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program
PROGRESA, I find that boys experience higher rates of bullying than girls, but bul-
lying affects only girls’ probability of dropping out of school.
The second essay (Chapter 3), “What Can Self-Esteem and Self-Control Tell us
about Problems in Survey Data?”, investigates the accuracy of information on as-
sets collected through household surveys. Household assets information is frequently
used to do empirical research, and to guide public policy, such as generating official
measures of poverty or deciding who participates in social programs. Using a survey
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that asks questions regarding household assets to the wife and to the husband from
families participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA,
I find discrepancies between spouses in the possession of assets reported. For exam-
ple, when asked about the possession of a washing machine, the information reported
by the spouses did not coincide in 24% of the households. Psychological evidence
has found that individuals with low self-control are more likely to cheat in situations
when cheating provides an advantage, and individuals with low self-esteem are more
likely to present misleading information in order to influence others’ points of view
about them. As a consequence, the information collected by household surveys po-
tentially can be affected by the self-esteem and self-control of the individuals who are
interviewed. Ordinary Least Squares results show that self-esteem and self-control
explain the difference in the possession of assets reported. To address the problem
of omitted variable bias, two bounding techniques are implemented: Oster (2016)
and Krauth (2016). The results are robust to the problem of omitted variables when
Oste’s bounding methodology is implemented, but not when Krauth’s methodology
is implemented.
The third essay (Chapter 4), “Are Disaster Funds Enough to Smooth Consump-
tion?”, analyzes the use of disaster funds to protect families’ consumption levels from a
natural disaster. Natural disasters worldwide have increased considerably as a conse-
quence of climate change, and empirical evidence has found that individuals decrease
their levels of consumption following a natural disaster. While countries can rely
on loans and aid from the international community when facing a natural disaster,
one alternative is to use disaster funds and catastrophe bonds. Mexico was the first
developing country to use disaster funds and catastrophe bonds through the Fund
for Natural Disasters (FONDEN). The FONDEN program provides food to house-
holds and resources for the reconstruction of infrastructure. De Janvry, Del Valle,
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and Sadoulet (2016) find evidence that this program increases local economic activity
between 2 and 4 percent in the year following the disaster. Yet, can FONDEN smooth
the consumption of the families affected? To answer this question, I analyze data for
Hurricane Earl in Puebla, Mexico, where FONDEN resources were implemented. Us-
ing a difference-in-difference strategy, results show a decrease in consumption, includ-
ing beans, which is an essential staple good for Mexican families. It is possible that
the consumption of families would have been more affected without the FONDEN;
yet, the resources of FONDEN were not enough to fully smooth families’ consumption.
The results of these essays have implications for current public policy. Regarding
the first essay, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by 193 countries,
made a commitment that all girls and boys will complete their secondary education
by 2030. Yet, my paper suggests that bullying is a roadblock in achieving this goal,
particularly for girls. The second essay sends a message regarding the quality of
data about assets. For example, when using data to construct a proxy means test,
policy makers recognize that individuals have incentives to underreport income. As
a consequence, they use variables such as the possession of assets to proxy the real
income of the households. It is assumed that there are no incentives to misreport
these variables. Yet, this paper presents evidence that contradicts this assumption.
In this sense, it is necessary to implement strategies that can provide incentives to
individuals to accurately report the data. Finally, the third essay presents evidence
that the FONDEN program was not enough to protect the consumption of families
who were affected. In this sense, it is necessary that the program review whether the
quantity, quality, and periodicity with which food is distributed are the most appro-
priate. Improving these factors potentially can help to smooth the consumption of
families affected in the short term by a natural disaster.
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Chapter 2
Girls vs. Boys: Who is Dropping
Out of School Because of Bullying?
2.1 Introduction
Bullying is a problem that exists in many countries around the world. It ranges
from 9 percent in Italy to 74 percent in Samoa among adolescents between 13 and
15 years old (United Nations, 2014). Alarmingly, bullying has been associated with
increasing levels of depression (Tfoti, Farringon, Lo¨sel, and Loeber, 2011), problems
of low self-esteem (Smokowski and Kopaz, 2005), and affecting academic performance
(Nakamoto and Shwartz, 2010). Despite the overall negatives effects of bullying on
the well-being of adolescents, there is little research about its effects on dropout rates
in schools.
To understand the effect of bullying on the probability of dropping out of school,
I exploit a rich data set of adolescents between 13 and 16 years old from families
participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA. The
results show that boys experience higher rates of bullying than girls, but bullying has
consequences for dropping out of school only for girls. In particular, one standard
deviation increase in being bullied increases the probability of girls dropping out of
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school by 10 percentage points.
One of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) states that
all girls and boys will complete their secondary education by 2030 (United Nations,
2015). Yet, bullying can be a roadblock in achieving this goal. To the best of my
knowledge, there are only two papers that analyze the relationship between bullying
and dropping out of school. Cornell et al. (2013), using data from 276 Virginia public
schools in the United States, suggest that one standard deviation increase in being
bullied is associated with 16.5% increase in the number of dropouts. Townsend et
al. (2008), using data from 1,470 students in Cape Town, South Africa, find that,
when facing bullying, girls - but not boys - are more likely to drop out of school.1
While these papers control for several well-known variables related with dropping
out of school, their results could potentially be biased as a consequence of important
omitted variables affecting both bullying and dropping out of school. For example,
factors related with the adolescents personality can help them to cope with an even
minimize - bullying, but this information is not completely observed in the data.
An approach to evaluate the robustness of estimated relationships to omitted
variable bias is to include additional control variables in a regression. Altonji, et al.
(2005) and Oster (2016) observed that adding controls is not enough. In particular,
they argue that it is necessary to observe the movements in the coefficient of interest,
but also the changes in the R-squared. To assess the problem of omitted variable bias,
I use two recently developed bounding methodologies: one developed by Oster (2016)
and the other by Krauth (2016). Their strategy assumes that adding observed control
variables is informative about the bias due to unobservable variables, and based on
this assumption, conditions for bounds and identification are provided.
1In particular, using a logistic regression, they report an odds ratio of 2.60
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This paper contributes to the literature showing that bullying has important con-
sequences for dropping out of school. Using the methodologies of Oster (2016) and
Krauth (2016), I find that bullying increases the dropout rate of girls, but not of boys,
and that these results are robust to the problem of omitted variable bias. This finding
supports the gender paradox effect of bullying proposed by Loeber and Keenan (1994).
The gender paradox effect establishes that boys experience higher rates of bullying
than girls, but bullying affects more negatively the well-being of girls than of boys.
Finally, using the methodology proposed by Acharia et al. (2016), I examine whether
bullying affects girls probability of dropping out of school through three different
channels: self-esteem, anxiety, and stress. I find no evidence to suggest that the im-
pact of bullying on dropout rates is due to its effects on self-esteem, anxiety, or stress.
In terms of public policy, it is useful to analyze the relationship between bullying
and conditional cash transfers (CCTs). CCTs have ben shown to increase the en-
rollment of adolescents from low-income families in schools;2 but the negative social
stigma associated with poverty potentially makes these adolescents more vulnerable
to being bullied at school. Sze´kely (2015), using a survey of dropouts between 15
and 17 years old in Mexico, finds that the percentage of dropouts who reported ha-
rassment by other students as the principal cause for dropping out of school is 2.8%.
But this reason is 11.3% for dropouts who have a PROGRESA scholarship. In this
sense, bullying potentially can reduce the positive effects of PROGRESA and it will
be useful to understand if this result is a consequence of the stigma from being poor
2Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have systematically proved to be effective policies to reduce
dropout rates (Kremer et al. 2013, Glewwe and Muralidharan 2016, Snilstveit et al. 2016). These
programs offer cash transfers to families living in poverty on the condition that they send their
school-age children to school. These programs were started with Mexicos well-known social program
PROGRESA, which showed positive impacts on school enrollment. For example, the program
resulted in one additional year of school in the adolescents who are beneficiaries (Skoufias and Parker
2001). And based on this evidence, more than 50 countries have implemented CCT programs.
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or from participating in the PROGRESA program. While the results presented in
this paper are limited to adolescents participating in PROGRESA, this could be an
unintended consequence of other conditional cash transfer programs around the world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related litera-
ture; Section 3 introduces the data and the empirical strategy; Section 4 presents the
results; and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
.
Sze´kely (2015), using a national survey conducted in Mexico on dropouts between
15 and 17 years old records the following reasons given by dropouts for not attending
school (see Table 2.1): lack of money (39%); lack of interest in school (11%); and
the student failed some courses (11%). When analyzing the data for adolescents who
received scholarships from PROGRESA, he found that lack of money is still one of
the most significant reasons, but the percentage is reduced to 24%. More interesting
is the question related to dropping out of school as a consequence of harassment by
other students. At the national level, the percentage of dropouts who reported this
reason is only 2.8%, but this reason is reported by 11.3% of dropouts who previously
had a PROGRESA scholarship. This result may simple be a consequence of the
poverty of PROGRESA’s students. However, it is important to consider whether it
can be due to a social stigma associated with participating in this program.
According to INEGI (2014), 32.2% of students in Mexico between 12 and 18 years
old were victims of abuse by their classmates. To the best of my knowledge, there are
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no studies in Mexico about the causal effects of bullying on dropping out of school,
yet it is clear that being bullied has negative consequences on the adolescents’ well-
being. Sarzosa and Urzu´a (2015) find that being bullied at school causes depression,
stress, and overall dissatisfaction with life. And dissatisfaction with life is associated
with low levels of self-estem. In this sense, Waddell (2006) finds that adolescents with
low self-esteem complete fewer years of upper secondary school education and are less
likely to be employed as adults. These findings suggest that being bullied may be an
important factor to explain why young people drop out of school.
It is equally important to consider the adolescents gender when analyzing bully-
ing. Loeber and Keenan (1994) show that boys experience higher rates of bullying
than girls, but bullying affects more negatively the well-being of girls than boys (the
gender paradox). Townsend et al. (2008), using data from 1,470 students in Cape
Town, South Africa, find that when facing bullying, girls - but not boys - are more
likely to drop out of school.
To analyze the effect of bullying on dropping out of school, I use data for adoles-
cents participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program, PROGRESA.
PROGRESA offers monthly cash transfers to families living in poverty on the con-
dition that they send their school-age children to school.3 The scholarship amounts
increase as the school-age children reach higher grade levels. The size of the schol-
arship under PROGRESA is designed to cover the opportunity cost to the family of
keeping their children in school. This opportunity cost is measured as the potential
salary these children could earn from working (Levy and Rodr´ıguez, 2005).
3In addition, the adolescents need to participate in local health talk workshops on a regular basis.
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Despite the success of PROGRESA,4 the percentage of lower secondary students
who continued onto upper secondary school was below 60% until 2010. From 2011 to
2014, this percentage increased from 64.5% to 71.4%. While this increase is consider-
able, almost 30% of adolescents still do not reach upper secondary school.5 Gutie´rrez,
Norman and Alcala´ (2013), find that 35% of adolescents between 14 and 17 years old
from families participating in this program are not enrolled in school, and this per-
centage is higher than the national rate of 27%.
Bentaouet and Sze´kely (2014), using data from Mexico, find that having a post-
secondary education is associated with income levels approximately 3.5 times higher
than those observed for individuals with only a lower secondary education, and 2
times higher than individuals with an upper secondary education. If the returns on
education are high in Mexico and the opportunity cost is covered, one would expect
the students in the PROGRESA program to continue attending the school. However,
the program design does not consider other potential factors that can increase the
cost of attending school, such as bullying.
4The evaluations of the program have shown positive impacts. For example, PROGRESA in-
creased years of schooling by one year for adolescents who participated in the program (Skoufias and
Parker, 2001), and children between 12 and 36 months who participated in PROGRESA were one
centimeter taller (Behrman, et. al. 2008). In 2002, the program changed its name to Oportunidades.
Based on its success, the program expanded to include five million families (i.e. one in five families
in Mexico) and extended the scholarships to upper secondary school students. Also, a new incentive
was incorporated called Jo´venes con Oportunidades, which gives money directly to the students who
complete upper secondary education. Under Oportunidades, the program expanded its presence in
urban areas. In particular, from 2008 to 2010, the number of participating families in urban areas
increased from 759,494 to 1,559,494. In 2015, the program changed its name to PROSPERA, adding
new components in order to promote productive activities among the women, such as access to credit
at a low interest rate. Today, the program serves more than 6.8 million families in Mexico.
5It is possible that this result is consequence of the expansion of the program to urban areas.
When the program was predominantly in rural areas, the transition from lower secondary to upper
secondary was below 60%. But, when the program incorporated a considerable number of children
in urban areas this percentage increased to 71.4%. In other words, this increase in the percent-
age is potentially capturing the higher rates of enrollment in urban areas rather than successful
improvements of the program.
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2.3 Data
To analyze the effects of bullying on dropping out of the school, I use a database
that was developed in 2010 to analyze the conditions of families living in poverty who
were participating in Mexico’s PROGRESA conditional cash transfer program. The
survey collected information on the non-cognitive skills of adolescents and their par-
ents. A random sample of 2,112 households was selected from families participating
in the program in both rural and urban areas. In the case of the adolescents, it was
decided to collect information from those between 13 and 16 years old. The survey
collected information from 1,093 of these adolescents, who lived in 837 households.
Two children who never went to school were excluded, so the final sample for this
study is 1,091 adolescents.
Of these 1,091 young people between the ages of 13 and 16, 80.3% were currently
attending school and 19.7% had dropped out of school. For those who were attending
the school, the 80.3% can be divided into 65.4% who were attending school and not
working outside the home, and 14.9% who were attending the school and working
outside the home. The 19.7% who dropped out of the school can be divided into
11.5% who were working outside the home and not attending school, and 8.2% who
were neither working outside the home nor attending school (see Table 2.2).6 There
are important differences between boys and girls who dropped out of school. Re-
garding the adolescents who neither work outside the home nor attend school, the
percentage of boys (out of all boys) in this group is only 3.3%, while the percentage
of girls (out of all girls) is four times higher (14.3%). In the case of the adolescents
who were working outside the home and not attending school, the percentage of girls
6The survey asked these adolescents about their current labor-education situation. The adoles-
cents responded by selecting the group that they were most closely related to, i.e. attending school
and not working outside the home, working outside the home and not attending school, working
outside the home and attending school; and neither working outside the home nor attending school.
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in this group (out of all girls) is 5.2%, while the percentage of boys (out of all boys)
is more than three times higher (16.5%).
I develop an index of bullying based on principal components. In addition, I use
this methodology to develop indexes for the following variables that I will use as
controls: self-esteem, authoritative parents, and family support. The bullying index
is based on Rigby (1998), and the self-esteem index is based on Rosenberg (1965).
The measure of authoritative parenting style is based on Arnold, OLeary, Wolff and
Acker (1993) and Robinson et al. (1995). Finally, the family support scale is based
on Millburn (1987) and Zimet, Dahlem, and Farley (1988). All the tests were adapted
by Palomar (2015) in Mexico. The questions have the following categorical answers:
“always, “frequently, “rarely and “never. I aggregate those answers into scales using
principal components analysis, retaining only the first latent factor.7 I then stan-
dardized the value of the latent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one. The results show that there is little difference between boys and
girls regarding self-esteem, authoritative parents, and family support. However, on
average, boys experience higher levels of bullying than girls (see Table 2.3).
The data in Table 2.3 also contain other information that I will use as control
variables. Regarding health problems, 5.1% of the adolescents have (or have had)
a disease that interferes (interfered) with their activities. This percentage is higher
for girls (6.6%) than for boys (3.9%). There are 4.4% children who have a parent in
prison, and 5.4% of children for whom one parent has died. The data also contain
information on whether girls have become pregnant and whether boys have impreg-
nated girls. Overall, 4.8% of these adolescents stated they are in this situation. This
7I present the results of the principal components analysis in Table A1 of the appendix. Column
1 presents the scales with its eigenvalues, Column 2 presents the questions used to build each scale,
and Column 3 shows the loading associated with each question.
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percentage is 5.5% for girls and 4.2% for boys. Concerning siblings, on average, these
adolescents have three siblings, of which two are older. Table 2.3 also reports infor-
mation about alcohol consumption of parents. The adolescents reported that 2.3%
of their mothers consume alcohol, while the percentage is 24.6% for fathers. Regard-
ing insecurity, these adolescents were asked questions about observing the following
activities in their neighborhood: gangs, people selling drugs, and prostitution. On
average, boys observe more of these activities than girls; for example, 32.0% of boys
have observed people selling drugs, while this percentage is 23.8% for girls.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
2.4.1 Identification Strategy
This paper analyzes the effects of bullying on the probability of dropping out of
school for adolescents participating in PROGRESA. The model to estimate is given
by:
Y= β T + γ X + e .
where Y is the outcome of interest (a dummy variable indicating whether an ado-
lescent has dropped out of school), T is the variable of interest (bullying), X is a
vector of observed control variables, and e is an error term with mean zero.
A study of this type presents several econometric challenges. First, the measure of
bullying is a proxy variable, so there is a potential problem of measurement error. It
is well-known that when regressors are measured with random error, the parameters
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estimated tend to be biased toward zero. Second, bullying may be correlated with
other psychological variables not present in the data. If such variables are correlated
with the outcome of interest, then they are in the error term e and their correlation
with T will generate bias in the estimated impacts of bullying. Finally, although
reverse causality is likely to be minimal, it can be a potential problem. In the case of
students who dropped out of school, the questions regarding bullying refer to the time
when the adolescents were attending school. A potential problem of reverse causality
can occur if these dropouts return to school and doing so affects the level of bullying.
However, using data from Mexico, Baron et al. (2016) find that once young people
between 15 and 18 years old leave school, it is very unlikely that they will return;
this minimizes the possibility that not attending school can affect the level of bullying.
To address the problem of omitted variable bias, I use two recently developed
bounding methodologies: one developed by Oster (2016) and the other by Krauth
(2016). Consider first Oster’s (2016) methodology. A common approach to evaluate
robustness to omitted variable bias is to include additional control variables on the
right hand side of the regression (Altonji et al., 2005). If such additions do not affect
the coefficient of interest, then this coefficient can be considered to be reliable. This
strategy implicitly assumes that selection on observables is informative about selec-
tion on unobservables. Oster (2016) formalize this idea, and provides conditions for
bounds and identification. Following the notation in Oster (2016), the full model has
the form:
Y= β T+ X1 + X2 +.
where T is the variable of interest, X1 contains the observed control variables
multiplied by their coefficients, i.e. X1 =
∑Jo
j=1 x
o
jγ
o
j , and X2 contains all unobserved
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variables multiplied by their coefficients, i.e. X2 =
∑Ju
j=1 x
u
j γ
u
j . Finally,  is a random
error that represents measurement error in Y and is uncorrelated with X1, X2, and
T. Oster (2016) suggests the following approach to account for omitted variable bias:
(1) Regress Y on T, and report the parameter on T, denoted by β0, and the R-
squared coefficient, denoted by R0.
(2) Regress Y on T and X1, and report the parameter on T, denoted by β˜, and
the R-squared coefficient, denoted by R˜.
(3) Define Rmax as the overall R-squared of the model, that is the R-squared
that would be obtained from a regression of Y on both, observables (T, X1) and
unobservables (X2). Also, define δ to be a parameter that ensures the equality
Cov(T,X2)
V ar(X2)
= δCov(T,X1)
V ar(X1)
. In other words, this relationship formalizes the idea that
the magnitude and sign of the relationship between T and X1 provides some infor-
mation about the magnitude and sign of the relationship between T and X2.
8 Oster
(2016) shows that β∗ = β˜ − δ (β
0−β˜)(Rmax−R˜)
(R˜−R0) is a consistent estimator of the effect of
T on Y, β.
But, to estimate β∗, one needs estimates of δ and Rmax. Oster proposes assump-
tions for δ and Rmax that allows one to determine whether β
∗ is different from zero.
Oster (2016) proposes that Rmax = min{1.3R˜, 1}, where the R˜ is defined above.9
An alternative value for Rmax is given by Gonzalez and Miguel (2015), who used
8For example, if −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1, then the variable of interest (T) is no more correlated with
unobservables (X2) than it is correlated with observables (X1). The case 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 has a similar
interpretation, with the additional assumption that the relationship between T and X1 have the
same sign as the relationship between T and X2.
9The cut-off value of 1.3 is derived from a sample of 65 papers that have used randomized
controlled trials. She determined that using this cut-off allowed 90% of the randomized results to
continue being statistically significant.
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Rmax = R˜ + (R˜ − R0). In addition to the Rmax proposed above, I will use a con-
servative Rmax = 1. After determining the value of Rmax, Oster suggests that β
∗ be
calculated for all the following ranges of δ: 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.10 This allows one to construct
the set [β˜, β∗] for different values of δ and Rmax. If this set excludes zero, the results
from the controlled regressions can be considered to be robust to omitted variable
bias. In other words, the results indicate that β∗ 6= 0.
One benefit of Osters bounding methodology is that it provides an intuitive way
to arrive at a bounding strategy. However, her approach requires information for
two key parameters (Rmax and δ), and her method does not provide statistical infer-
ence about the bounding. Krauths bounding methodology, while more complex has
two advantages over Osters methodology. First, it requires information only about
δ. Second, it provides inference about the bounding based on Imbens and Manski
(2004) confidence intervals. Krauths methodology proceeds using the following model:
Y= Y(T)= βTT + U
Let UP = X1βX1 be the best linear predictor of U given X1 (a group of control
variables):
βX1 = E(X
′
1X1)E(X
′
1Y )− βTE(X ′1X1)E(X ′1T )
Thus:
Y=βTT + X1βX1 + , where E(X
′
1 ) = 0
Krauth specifies δ such that:
10In addition, I will present the results for δ: −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0.
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Cov(T,)√
V ar()
= δ
Cov(T,X1βX1 )√
V ar(X1βX1 )
where δ ∈ ∆ = [δL, δH ], i.e. in a finite interval.
Notice that δ can be rewritten as:
δ(βT ) =
corr(T,)
corr(T,X1βX1 )
=
corr(T,Y−βTT−X1βX1 (βT ))
corr(T,X1βX1 (βT ))
Then, Krauth shows the following properties of δ(βT ):
i. δ(βT ) exists and is differentiable for all βT 6= β∞ (the value of βT at which
corr(T,X1βX1(βT )) = 0).
ii. There is a δ∞ = limβT→∞δ(βT ) = limβT→−∞δ(βT ) and δ
∞ ≥ 0, i.e. the limit as
βT approaches positive or negative infinity is δ
∞.
iii. Notice that from i and ii, δ(βT ) takes the form of a hyperbolic funtion (see
Figure 2.3). Thus, if given the relative correlation restriction ∆ = [δL, δH ], the
bounds [βLT , β
H
T ] can be found by inverting δ(βT ).
See Krauth (2016) for the details of how his approach allows him to obtain the
Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval for the identified set.
2.5 Results
To analyze the effects of bullying on dropping out of school, I first present the
results using an OLS regression, and then apply the two bounding strategies.11
11The Oster and Krauth strategies use a linear regression, which explains why I use OLS rather
than alternatives such as a probit or logit. However, when analyzing the variable of interest (bully-
ing), the results using probit or logit are similar to those using OLS (see Table A2 in appendix).
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Table 2.4 column 1, presents a linear probability model (OLS regression) of
the impact of bullying on the probability of dropping out of school. I control for
father died, mother died, parent in prison, sex, number of siblings, number of siblings
who are older, age, and age squared. The results show that one standard deviation
increase in being bullied increases the probability of dropping out of school by 5.6 per-
centage points. To check the robustness of this result, column 2 incorporates dummy
variables for states, and column 3 uses dummy variables for municipalities. Bully-
ing continues to be statistically significant, although the impact is slightly diminished.
Given that bullying is measured with error, if this measurement error is random,
then the estimates in Table 2.4 underestimate the causal effect and thus are lower
bounds of bullying on dropping out of school. However, it is also possible that es-
timates of the impact of bullying is affected by omitted variable bias. One way to
assess this problem is to add controls and analyze the stability of the parameter of
interest. Table 2.4, column 4 reproduces the analysis of column 3, but includes more
controls. The controls consist of information about girls pregnancies and boys im-
pregnating girls, the feeling of being insecure within their neighborhoods (existence
of gangs, people selling drugs, and prostitution), information about self-esteem and
health problems (i.e. whether the adolescent has experienced a disease that interferes
with his or her activities), and characteristics of the adolescents parents: having au-
thoritative parents, family support, and the alcohol consumption of the mothers and
fathers.12 Bullying continue to be statistically significant. Comparing column 3 with
column 4 of Table 2.4, the coefficient associated with bullying decreased from 4.9 to
3.8 percentage points.
12I do not have information on alcohol consumption of the mothers and fathers when the father or
the mother has died. These missing values were replaced by the average of the respective variables.
17
Oster (2016) shows that just adding controls, which is a common strategy, is
not enough to avoid omitted variable bias. Table 2.5 presents results using Osters
methodology to analyze the robustness of the results in Table 2.4. Panel A presents
the results under the assumption that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, i.e. assuming that the relationship
between the variable of interest and the (aggregated) controls has the same sign as
the relationship between the variable of interest and the (aggregated) unobservables.
Column 1 estimates bounds using the value of the Rmax proposed by Oster (2016),
which yields a very tight bounds estimate of [0.055, 0.056]. To check the robustness of
this estimate of the bounds, I estimate bounds using the Rmax proposed by Gonzalez
and Miguel (2015) in Column 2. The bounding estimated the same: [0.055, 0.056].
To further check the robustness of the results, I use the extreme value that Rmax = 1,
which yields a bounding estimate of [0.045, 0.056] in column 3.
Panel B presents the results when −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0.13 Using the Rmax proposed by
Oster, the bounding estimated again is very tight: [0.056, 0.057]. Using the Rmax
proposed by Gonzalez and Miguel, the bounding again is the same: [0.056, 0.057].
Finally, using a conservative Rmax = 1, the bound is: [0.056, 0.067]. To sum up, the
effect of bullying on dropping out of school is robust when Osters bounding method-
ology is used.
Table 2.5, column 4, presents analogous results using Krauths methodology. As-
suming that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the bounding associated with bullying is [0.044, 0.056].
However, the 95% confidence interval associated with this estimate is much larger
(0.005, 0.081), although it still reject the hypothesis of no effects of bullying on drop-
ping out. If instead one assumes that −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, the bounding associated with
13The case −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0 assumes that the relationship between T and X1 has different sign than
the relationship between T and X2.
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bullying is [0.056, 0.065]. The confidence interval at the 95% level associated with
bullying is (0.030, 0.094) which again rejects the null hypothesis of no impact of bul-
lying. Finally, I present the value of the minimum δ for which the bounds include
zero, being this value 3.234. As a consequence, regardless of which methodology is
used, bullying is robust to the problem of omitted variables.
Bullying can potentially have different consequences by sex. Table 2.6 reproduces
the results presented in Table 2.4, but differentiates between girls (columns 1 to 3)
and boys (columns 4 to 6). For girls, the results show that bullying is statistically
significant (see column 1). This result is maintained when dummy variables for states
(column 2) and municipalities (column 3) are included. For boys, bullying is statisti-
cally significant (see column 4), and this result is maintained when dummy variables
for states (column 5) and municipalities (column 6) are included. Yet, the size of the
impact for boys is much smaller than for girls.
To analyze the robustness of the effects of bullying on girls probability of dropping
out of school, I apply Osters methodology and the results are presented in Table 2.7.
Panel A presents the results when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Column 1 use the Rmax proposed by Os-
ter, the bound on the effect of bullying is [0.102, 0.107]. Using the Rmax proposed by
Gonzalez and Miguel (2015), the bound is [0.102, 0.115]. Finally, using a conservative
Rmax = 1, the bound estimated is [0.102, 0.195]. Assuming −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, the effects
of bullying on the probability of dropping out of the school is presented in Panel B.
Using the Rmax proposed by Oster, the bound estimated is [0.097, 0.102]. Using the
Rmax proposed by Gonzalez and Miguel, the bound is [0.090, 0.102]. Finally, using
a conservative Rmax = 1, the bound estimated has a range of [0.010, 0.102]. Thus,
bullying is robust to the problem of omitted variables for different assumptions using
Osters methodology.
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Column 4 in the first panel of Table 2.7 presents the results using Krauths method-
ology for the effects of bullying on girls’ probability of dropping out of school. As-
suming 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the bound associated with bullying is [0.102, 0.118]. The interval
confidence at the 95% level associated with bullying is (0.063, 0.165). In panel B,
which assumes −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, the bound associated with bullying is [0.087, 0.102]. The
95% confidence interval for the impact of bullying on dropping out of school is (0.029,
0.141). Finally, I present the value of the minimum δ for which the bounds include
zero. This value, -9.217, is extremely large. The results using Krauths methodology
confirm the previous result, based on Osters methodology, regarding the robustness
of the bullying to the problem of omitted variable bias when analyzing its effects on
girls probability of dropping out of school.
To analyze the robustness of the results for the case of boys, I again apply Osters
methodology. The results are presented in Table 2.8. When 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and Rmax = 1,
the bound is [-0.021,0.038]. Thus, the estimated bounds include zero. The results
using Krauth’s methodology are presented in column 4. The estimated bounds for
bullying exclude zero. However, when 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 the confidence interval associated
with the variables of interest includes zero. So, in the case of boys, the negative im-
pact of bullying on dropping out is not robust to the problem of omitted variable bias.
2.5.1 Mechanisms
Bullying is an important factor explaining the probability of dropping out of school
for girls. However, this opens the question about what the mechanisms are by which
bullying affects the dropout rates. In particular, is bullying increasing the dropout
rates because of its effects on adolescents well-being (self-esteem, anxiety, and stress)?
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Or is bullying increasing the probability of dropping out of school independent of the
problems associated with the well-being of adolescents?
The psychological literature suggests that being bullied affects students levels
of self-esteem, anxiety, and stress. First, I analyze whether these relationships are
present in the data, and second, whether these variables are the potential mechanisms
by which bullying affects the probability of dropping out of school. Table 2.9 presents
an OLS regression of the impacts of bullying on self-esteem (column 1), anxiety (col-
umn 2), and stress (column 3). The results confirm the relationship between bullying
and these variables. In particular, the results show that a one standard deviation
increase in being bullied is associated with 0.15 standard deviation decrease in the
self-esteem index; a 0.20 standard deviation increase in the anxiety index; and 0.30
standard deviation decrease in the stress index.
To test whether bullying affects girls probability of dropping out of school through
self-esteem, anxiety, stress, and peer relationships, I will use the methodology pro-
posed by Acharia et al. (2016). A common approach to identify mechanisms is simply
to control for post-treatment variables, i.e. variables that are believed to be the mech-
anisms through which the variable of interest is affecting the outcome. In this case
the potential post-treatment variables are self-esteem, anxiety, and stress. If the post-
treatment variables are significant and they eliminated the significance of the variable
of interest (in this case bullying), then we can say that these post-treatment variables
are mechanism through which bullying is affecting the outcome of interest. Acharia
et al. (2016) present evidence that conditioning on post-treatment variables poten-
tially introduces bias; and in order to handle this problem they propose a sequential
g-estimation. The basic idea is that instead of including directly the post-treatment
variables on the right hand side, they follow a two-step approach. In the first step,
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they calculate the effect of the post-treatment variables (mechanism) on the outcome
while controlling for the variable of interest (bullying) and other controls. In the
second step, they demediate the outcome of interest with the value associated with
the post-treatment variable. Finally, they regress the outcome demediated on the
variable of interest and the pretreatment confounders.
Figure 2.1 presents the results when self-esteem is considered as a mechanism be-
tween bullying and dropping out of school. Model (a) is the baseline model using
the covariates presented in Table 2.6. The coefficient associated with bullying is .102.
Model (b) presents the results when using the g-estimation model, and the coefficient
associated with bullying is .10. Thus, the direct effect of bullying on dropping out of
school using the g-estimation is almost identical to the baseline. Figure 2.1 presents
the analysis when the mechanism is anxiety. The coefficient associated with bully-
ing is .0970 when using the g-estimator. Finally, Figure 2.2 presents the coefficient
associated with bullying when the mechanism is stress and its value is .0979. So, it ap-
pears that there is a strong direct effect of bullying on dropouts even if the girls have
no problems of self-esteem, anxiety, or stress. Another interpretation of this result is
that mechanisms other than those used above have an indirect effect on dropout rates.
Another important question is what happens with girls after they drop out of
school. Do girls, after suffering bullying, end up working outside the home? Or do
girls end up neither studying nor working outside the home? Table 2.10 presents
results similar to those in Table 2.6, except that the dependent variable is a dummy
for girls who neither work nor attend school, and thus it excludes those who work
and do not attend school. The regressions are presented in columns 1 to 3. The
results show that bullying is statistically significant (see column 1). These results
continue to hold when dummy variables for states (column 2) and for municipalities
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(column 3) are included. Regarding the coefficient associated with bullying, a one
standard deviation increase in being bullied increases that probability by 7.2 percent-
age points. Table 2.10, columns 4 to 6, present results similar to those in columns 1
to 3, except that the dependent variable is a dummy variable for girls who work but
do not attend school, and thus it excludes those who neither work nor attend school.
Bullying is statistically significant (see column 4). And this result is maintained when
dummy variables for states (column 5) and municipalities (column 6) are included.
In particular, a one standard deviation increase in bullying increase the probability
of working but not attending the school by 5.3 percentage points. Thus, once girl
drop out of school as a consequence of bullying, they end working outside the home,
but it is also probable that girls end up neither studying nor working outside the home.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper finds evidence that bullying leads to increased drop out rates in ado-
lescents participating in the Mexican conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA,
specially among girls. The previous literature that has analyzed this relationship has
faced the problem of omitted variable bias. To address this problem, I use two newly
developed bounding methodologies one developed by Oster (2016) and the other
by Krauth - which provide evidence that the impact of bullying is robust and not
simply generated by omitted variable bias. This result supports the gender paradox
effect of bullying proposed by Loeber and Keenan (1994). This paradox states that
boys experience higher rates of bullying than girls, but bullying has more negative
consequences on the well-being of girls than on boys. Regarding the mechanisms, I
analyze whether bullying affects girls probability of dropping out of school through
self-esteem, anxiety and stress. Using a recent methodology developed by Acharia et
al. (2016), I do not find strong evidence that self-esteem, anxiety and stress are the
mechanisms.
PROGRESA is a successful conditional cash transfer program that has increased
the enrollment of adolescents living in poverty. Unfortunately, the condition of
poverty has been associated with increasing rates of being bullied. Thus, on the
one hand PROGRESA reduces the cost of attending the school for these adolescents;
but, on the other hand, it increases the chances that these adolescents suffer from bul-
lying, which may eventually lend them to drop out of school. While the results of this
paper apply to the case of PROGRESA, it would be very useful to explore whether
this situation is happening in other conditional cash transfers programs around the
world.
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Figure 2.1: Estimated Effects of Bullying on Dropping Out of School trough Self-
estem and Anxiety
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Figure 2.2: Estimated Effects of Bullying on Dropping Out of School trough Stress
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Figure 2.3: A Tipical δ Function
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Table 2.1: Causes of School Dropout among Adolescents between 15 and 17 years
by Types of Scholarship
Total PROGRESA
Scholarship
% %
Lack of money 39.4 24.0
Lack of interest toward school 10.6 23.6
The student failed some courses 10.6 22.8
Harassment by other students 2.8 11.3
Other 36.6 18.3
Source: Table adapted from Sze´kely (2015)
Table 2.2: Education and Labor Situation among Adolescents between 13 and 16
years old
Total Men Women
All % % %
Studying and not working outside the home 65.4 59.2 73.3
Studying and working outside the home 14.9 21.0 7.2
Working outside the home 11.5 16.5 5.2
Neither studying nor working outside the home 8.2 3.3 14.3
Total 1,091 608 483
Source: Encuesta de resiliencia en beneficiarios de Oportunidades .
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Table 2.3: Basic Descriptive Statistics
Total Girls Boys
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Bullying (Std) 0 1 -.184 0.803 0.143 1.109
Self-esteem (Std) 0 1 0.001 0.966 -0.001 1.003
Authoritative parents (Std) 0 1 0.038 0.993 -0.030 1.004
Family support (Std) 0 1 0.051 1.022 -0.040 0.981
Health problems 0.051 0.220 0.066 0.248 0.039 0.194
Parent in prison 0.044 0.207 0.045 0.208 0.044 0.206
Parent died 0.054 0.226 0.053 0.225 0.054 0.226
Pregnancy 0.048 0.215 0.055 0.229 0.042 0.202
Siblings 2.666 1.734 2.612 1.753 2.710 1.720
Siblings older 1.778 1.810 1.769 1.854 1.785 1.776
Mother’s alcohol consumption 0.025 0.159 0.031 0.174 0.021 0.145
Father’s alcohol consumption 0.246 0.431 0.230 0.421 0.258 0.438
Gangs 0.394 0.488 0.383 0.486 0.402 0.490
People selling drugs 0.284 0.451 0.238 0.426 0.320 0.467
Prostitution 0.194 0.395 0.178 0.382 0.207 0.405
Rural 0.509 0.500 0.496 0.500 0.519 0.500
Source: Encuesta de resiliencia en beneficiarios .
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimates: Effects of Bullying on Whether Adolescents Dropped Out
of School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep Var: Dropping Out
Bullying 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Father died 0.238∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.062) (0.062)
Mother died 0.178∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.173 0.157
(0.102) (0.102) (0.107) (0.107)
Parent in Prison 0.040 0.024 0.003 -0.007
(0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057)
Sex (Female=1) -0.010 -0.010 -0.015 -0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Siblings 0.034∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Siblings Older -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Age 0.262 0.271 0.464 0.427
(0.324) (0.323) (0.329) (0.329)
Age squared -0.007 -0.007 -0.014 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
State Fixed Effects No Yes No No
Municipality Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No No Yes
R2 0.12 0.15 0.23 0.25
Observations 981 981 981 980
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. The other
controls are: women’s pregnancy or men impregnating women (pregnancy), a
feeling of being insecure within their neighborhoods (existence of gangs, peo-
ple selling drugs, and prostitution), self-esteem, health problems, authoritative
parents, family support, parents are separated, mother’s alcohol consumption,
and father’s alcohol consumption.
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Table 2.5: Bounding Methodology: Effects of Bullying on Whether Adolescents
Dropped Out of School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oster Gonzalez and Miguel Conservative Krauth
(2016) (2015) (Rmax = 1) (2016)
Panel A : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Bullying [0.055, 0.056] [0.055, 0.056] [0.045, 0.056] [0.044, 0.056]
(95% CI) (0.005, 0.081)
Panel B : −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0
Bullying [0.056, 0.057] [0.056, 0.057] [0.056, 0.067] [0.056, 0.065]
(95% CI) (0.030, 0.094)
Minimum δ for which 3.234
bounds include zero
Intervals in squares brackets are the bounds, while the intervals in the round brackets are
confidence intervals. The control variables are: father died, mother died, parent in prison,
sex, siblings, siblings older, age, age squared, and living in a rural area.
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Table 2.6: OLS Estimates: Effects of Bullying on Whether Adolescents Dropped Out
of School by Sex
Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Dropping Out
Bullying 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Father died 0.268∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.200∗
(0.075) (0.077) (0.084) (0.095) (0.097) (0.103)
Mother died 0.337∗∗ 0.402∗∗ 0.283 0.103 0.147 0.108
(0.165) (0.174) (0.205) (0.134) (0.134) (0.137)
Parent in Prison 0.044 0.057 -0.028 0.038 0.018 0.033
(0.080) (0.082) (0.091) (0.073) (0.074) (0.077)
Siblings 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Siblings Older -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 -0.000 0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Age -0.096 -0.005 0.027 0.607 0.700 0.920∗
(0.466) (0.475) (0.485) (0.453) (0.455) (0.477)
Age squared 0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.019 -0.022 -0.029∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
State Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Municipality Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.16 0.20 0.35 0.10 0.15 0.24
Observations 429 429 429 552 552 552
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Bounding Methodology: Effects of Bullying on Whether Adolescents
Dropped Out of School (Girls)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oster Gonzalez and Miguel Conservative Krauth
Indepvar (2016) (2015) (Rmax = 1) (2016)
Panel A : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Bullying [0.102, 0.107] [0.102, 0.115] [0.102, 0.195] [0.102, 0.118]
(95% CI) (0.063, 0.165)
Panel B : −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0
Bullying [0.097, 0.102] [0.090, 0.102] [0.010, 0.102] [0.087, 0.102]
(95% CI) (0.029, 0.141)
Minimum δ for which -9.217
bounds include zero
Intervals in squares brackets are the bounds, while the intervals in the round brackets are
confidence intervals. The control variables are: father died, mother died, parent in prison,
sex, siblings, siblings older, age, age squared, and living in a rural area.
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Table 2.8: Bounding Methodology: Effects of Bullying on Whether Adolescents
Dropped Out of School (Boys)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oster Gonzalez and Miguel Conservative Krauth
(2016) (2015) (Rmax = 1) (2016)
Panel A : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Bullying [0.036, 0.038] [0.032, 0.038] [-0.021, 0.038] [0.019, 0.038]
(95% CI) (-0.022, 0.066)
Panel B : −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0
Bullying [0.038, 0.040] [0.038, 0.044] [0.038, 0.097] [0.038, 0.055]
(95% CI) (0.009, 0.090)
Minimum δ for which 1.919
bounds include zero
Intervals in squares brackets are the bounds, while the intervals in the round brackets are
confidence intervals. The control variables are: father died, mother died, parent in prison,
sex, siblings, siblings older, age, age squared, and living in a rural area.
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimates: Effects of Bullying on Self-esteem, Anxiety, and Stress
(1) (2) (3)
Dep Var: Self-esteem Anxiety Stress
Bullying -0.157** 0.209*** 0.300***
(0.062) (0.057) (0.060)
Father died 0.016 0.036 0.062
(0.229) (0.213) (0.225)
Mother died 0.473 -0.413 0.133
(0.505) (0.469) (0.495)
Parent in Prison 0.007 0.258 0.461∗
(0.243) (0.226) (0.239)
Siblings -0.054∗ -0.002 -0.016
(0.031) (0.029) (0.030)
Siblings Older 0.030 -0.001 -0.009
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
Age 0.703 -0.707 -2.932**
(1.422) (1.323) (1.395)
Age squared -0.023 0.020 0.099**
(0.049) (0.046) (0.048)
Constant -5.297 6.076 21.637**
(10.250) (9.535) (10.057)
R2 0.03 0.06 0.08
Observations 429 429 429
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.10: OLS Estimates: Effects of Bullying on whether Girls who Dropped Out
and end up Working Outside the Home or Neither Studying Nor Working outside the
Home
Work Inside the Home Work Outside the Home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bullying 0.087∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Father Died 0.279∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.033 0.043 0.013
(0.069) (0.071) (0.075) (0.058) (0.060) (0.075)
Mother Died 0.385∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.319∗ -0.016 -0.055 0.010
(0.147) (0.156) (0.181) (0.145) (0.160) (0.167)
Parent in Prison 0.036 0.051 -0.051 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.073) (0.075) (0.082) (0.054) (0.056) (0.062)
Siblings 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Siblings Older 0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Age 0.044 0.116 -0.052 -0.245 -0.201 0.029
(0.423) (0.433) (0.438) (0.306) (0.313) (0.329)
Age squared -0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -0.532 -1.150 0.124 1.440 1.077 -0.646
(3.045) (3.120) (3.162) (2.203) (2.257) (2.375)
State Fixed Effects No Yes No No Yes No
Municipality Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.12 0.16 0.35 0.13 0.18 0.27
Observations 410 410 410 386 386 386
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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Chapter 3
What Can Self-Esteem and
Self-Control Tell us about
Problems in Survey Data?
3.1 Introduction
Among the main instruments for conducting empirical research and making public
policy decisions are household surveys; yet, how accurate is the information collected
through such surveys? When answering a survey, individuals can have incentives
to underreport information. For example, Meyer and Mittag (2015) find evidence
that some individuals underreport income in order to get more assistance from the
government. But, individuals also can overreport information. Martinelli and Parker
(2009) find evidence that overreporting is present when individuals face an embarrass-
ing situation. While there have been some efforts to use statistical tools to identify
data abnormalities (e.g. Judge and Schechter, 2009), little attention has been paid to
the personality of the individuals who answer surveys. Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990)
propose that acts of deviant behavior, such as cheating, are related to low self-control.
Thus, people with low self-control are more likely to cheat in a survey. In addition,
answering certain types of survey questions can be embarrassing for some individuals.
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Embarrassment results when individuals feel negatively about themselves when re-
vealing information that can undermine their image as seen by other people. Recent
evidence in psychology has found that embarrassment and self-esteem are strongly
related. In particular, Libby et al. (2011) find that individuals with low self-esteem
are more likely to misreport information in order to maintain their psychological well-
being when facing embarrassing situations. Hence, self-esteem and self-control can
be important variables to understand data abnormalities.
Recent literature has found problems in the quality of the data collected, partic-
ularly in developing countries. Judge and Schechter (2009) used Benfords law1 to
analyze the quality of the data of nine commonly used datasets, including data from
the PROGRESA program in Mexico. They find that the data from Mexico was far
from satisfying Benfords law. Unfortunately, Benfords law cannot be applied to bi-
nary or categorical data but which are fundamental for understanding many aspects
of household behavior and welfare, such as the possession of assets.
To understand how self-esteem and self-control explain data anomalies, I use a
unique database that asks the same questions of the wife and of the husband re-
garding both psychological variables and the possession of assets in 903 households
in Mexico. The questions regarding assets are dummy variables, i.e. do you have
a refrigerator in your household? The results show important discrepancies between
the information reported by the wife and by the husband. For example, when asked
about the possession of a washing machine, the information reported by the spouses
did not coincide in 24% of the households. To understand the differences in the an-
swers provided by the wife and the husband, I generate: an index for the differences
1The idea behind Benfords law is that, in large data sets, numbers with a first digit of 1 are
observed more often than those starting with 2 and so on. In particular, Benfords law proposes
that: P(first digit is d)= log10(1 +
1
d ).
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in the possession of assets; an index of self-esteem based on the Rosenberg Self-esteem
Scale (1965); and an index of self-control based on the Self-Regulatory Questionnaire
(SQR) of Brown, et. al. (1999).2 Ordinary Least Squares results show that self-
esteem and self-control explain the differences in the possession of assets reported. In
particular, a one standard deviation increase in the square of husbands self-esteem
reduces by 0.065 standard deviations an index regarding the differences of assets re-
ported by each spouse. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in the square
of husbands self-control reduces by .070 standard deviations an index regarding the
differences of assets reported by each spouse.
Estimating the effects of self-esteem and self-control on the differences in the assets
reported between the husband and the wife is complicated by problems of measure-
ment error and omitted variable bias. If measurement errors in the self-esteem and
self-control variables are random, then the estimates of the impacts of self-esteem and
self-control on an index regarding the differences of assets reported by each spouse
underestimate the causal effect and thus they represent a lower bound on the true
effect. Regarding omitted variable bias, self-esteem and self-control may be correlated
with other psychological variables (or non psychological variables) not present in the
data. If such variables are correlated with the outcome of interest, then they are in
the error term and their correlation with self-esteem and/or self-control will generate
bias in the estimated impacts of those two variables. To assess the problem of omitted
variables, I use two recently developed bounding methodologies: one developed by
Oster (2016) and the other by Krauth (2016). Their strategies assume that adding
observed control variables is informative about the bias due to unobservable variables
and, based on this assumption, conditions for bounds and identification are provided.
My results suggest that the estimates of self-esteem and self-control are not robust
2All the indices were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
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to omitted variable bias.
Asset information is frequently used to do empirical research, and to guide public
policy, such as deciding who participates in social programs and/or generating mea-
sures of poverty. For example, many social programs use a proxy means test to decide
who participates in the program. Policy makers recognize that individuals have incen-
tives to underreport their income, and as a consequence, they have developed proxy
means tests as an alternative to collecting information on income. An important
element of these proxy means tests is the possession of assets. Yet, the results of this
paper show that information on assets can also be biased and potentially affect who
is eligible to participate in the program.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related liter-
ature; Section 3 introduces the data, and Section 4 describes the empirical strategy;
Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Philipson and Malani (1999) point out that economists pay much more attention
to the consumption of data than to the production of data. Judge and Schechter
(2009) mention that this point is consistent with the increasing literature on how
to handle problems of measurement errors, but little literature on how to prevent it.
Philipson and Malani (1999) propose that the data collection process can be analyzed
as a labor market where the investigator is the principal and the individuals who pro-
vide information are the agents. The problem is that the agents have preferences
(does the respondent want to tell the truth?) and problems of information (does the
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respondent know the truth?). This situation is the principal source of erroneous re-
porting. Thus, researchers and policy makers should be careful when empirical data
are used.
So, if there is a potential problem of erroneous reporting, how can one check the
quality of the data? Judge and Schechter (2009) proposed that Benfords law can be
used as a tool to detect problems in survey data. The idea behind Benfords law is that,
in large data sets, numbers with a first digit of 1 are observed more often than those
starting with 2, and so on. In particular, Benfords law proposes that: P(First digit
is d)= log10(1 +
1
d
). Judge and Schechter (2009) analyzed data from nine commonly
used datasets, including the Matlab Health and Socioeconomics Survey (MHSS) from
Bangladesh, the PROGRESA data from Mexico, the Living Standards Measurement
Survey (LSMS) from Peru, the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
from the United States, among others. Their principal result is that the data from
developing countries are of poor quality based on Benfords law, and the data from the
United States are of better quality. In addition, they reported no differences between
female and male respondents.
Yet, there is a problem with Benfords law. Many variables used for data analysis
are dummy or categorical variables, and Benfords law cannot be applied in such cases.
However, it is possible to assess data quality for dummy and categorical variables. For
example, Martinelli and Parker (2009), using data from PROGRESA, find evidence
of misreporting and overreporting when analyzing dummy and categorical variables.
When the program was expanded from rural to urban areas (2002), the applicants
first attended a registration meeting, and provided information in order to participate
in the program. From those who were eligible based on a household poverty index,
the program sent a representative to their house in order to verify the information
41
provided at the registration meeting. Martinelli and Parker (2009) compared these
sources of information, and they find underreporting in gas boilers, cars, trucks, and
washing machines; and they present evidence of overreporting in toilets, tap water,
and concrete floor. Thus, at least for the PROGRESA program, the dummy variables
are not free from measurement error.
Why do individuals not report the truth? In economic terms, it can be assumed
that individuals make a cost-benefit analysis. For example, individuals can consider
the potential benefits (such as access to a social program) of cheating (underreporting
information) and the cost of cheating (probability of being discovered and the poten-
tial penalties). Mazar and Ariely (2006) present evidence that in addition to the
external reward mechanisms (cost-benefit analysis), there are internal reward mecha-
nisms that affect the decisions of individuals regarding cheating. What other aspects
do individuals consider in addition to material payoffs? Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990)
propose that acts of deviant behavior, such as cheating, are related to low self-control.
In particular, people with lack of self-control tend to be impulsive, risk-taking, and
succumb to the desires of the moment. These elements are important predictors for
engaging in a deviant behavior. In particular, Gottfredson and Hirshi (1990) argue
that people value the desire to maximize self-interest (short-term) versus the desire
of being an honest person (long-term). This implis that people with high self-control
resist short-term temptations. Thus, it is plausible that people with low levels of
self-control are more likely to cheat in a survey.
Yet, Gino, Schweitzer, Mad, and Ariely (2011) propose that, under some circum-
stances, people with high levels of self-control can also cheat. They propose that, de-
spite having self-control, monitoring many decisions reduces peoples moral awareness,
with the consequence of increasing the probability of cheating. To present evidence
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of this hypothesis, they conducted experiments with college and graduate students.
The students were separated into two groups. The first group was asked to write an
essay without using the letters A and N and the other the letters X and Z. The first
group (under “depletion condition) required more effort, i.e. their cognitive condition
were more “taxed. Then, the students solved a set of problems on the computer, and
they self-report their performance. This task was intended to give the students the
opportunity to cheat. The results show that participants cheated more when they
were included in the “depletion condition group. Why is this result important for the
present research? When answering a survey, it is possible that the cognitive ability
of the individuals is “taxed by trying to answer all the questions that need to be
answered. Increasing the probability that, as individuals with low self-control, indi-
viduals with high levels of self-control end up cheating. This leads to a situation where
self-control will not be able to explain potential discrepancies in the survey conducted.
Regarding self-esteem, Tyler and Feldman (2005) find evidence that the accuracy
of the information is tied with self-esteem. For example, when facing an embarrassing
situation, individuals with low self-esteem are more likely to change how the situation
looks in order to maintain their psychological well-being (Libby, Eibach, Valenti, and
Pfent, 2011) and present misleading information in order to influence others point of
view about themselves (Godfrey, Jones, and Lord, 1986). Hence, self-esteem can be
an important variable for identifying data abnormalities.
3.3 Data
To analyze the effects of self-esteem and self-control on the differences in the pos-
session of assets reported by the wife and the husband, I use a database from couples
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participating in Mexico’s PROGRESA conditional cash transfer program. The sur-
vey collected information from 903 couples on non-cognitive skills and socioeconomic
information. To analyze the quality of the data, I follow Judge and Schechter (2009),
and I use a χ2 test to check the extent to which the data conform with Benfords law.
The results are presented in Table 3.1 and the variables that I analyze are income,
light bulbs and number of rooms. Separately by the gender of the respondent, for
the three variables analyzed I reject the null hypothesis that the data follow Benfords
law. This opens the possibility that the data contain abnormalities.
As pointed out above, Benfords law cannot be applied to the analysis of dummy
variables. So, what is the quality of the PROGRESA data regarding the possession
of assets, which are represented by dummy variables? Table 3.2, column 1, shows
the possession of assets reported by husbands and column 2 those reported by wives.
There are no important discrepancies when comparing column 1 and 2. For example,
63.5% of the husbands reported the possession of a refrigerator in their houses, while
this percentage is 65.1% for wives. One tentative interpretation of this result is that
when asked information regarding dummy variables the information collected is not
so bad, in contrast to the results for Benfords law. Column 3 presents the percentage
of mismatch regarding the 18 items, i.e. the percentage of cases when the information
provided by husbands did not coincide with the information provided by wives. This
suggest problems with the quality of the data collected. For example, in the case
of having a refrigerator, for 21.3% of the couples the information provided by the
husband did not match the information provided by the wife. In particular, for 9.8%
of the cases, the husband responded that the household had a refrigerator and the
wife replied that the household was not in a possession of a refrigerator (see column
4); and for 11.5% the husband responded that the household was not in a possession
of a refrigerator while the wife responded that the household had a refrigerator (see
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column 5). The percentage when there is a mismatch goes for 2.2% in the case of
having a canoe up to 32.9% for the case of having a music device (see column 3). Yet,
the percentage of mismatching is lower than 10% in the cases when the assets are
present in a high proportion (like having a TV) or when the assets are almost absent
in the majority of the households (like having a canoe).
Table 3.3 presents aggregate information about the asset ownership reported by
the wife and the husband. For the 18 items asked, the number of discrepancies
between the wife and the husband ranges from 0 (perfect coincidence) to 12. For ex-
ample, for 13.8% of the couples, the information reported by the wife and the husband
coincided exactly. Yet, Table 3.3 also presents evidence that in 15% of the couples,
the answers reported were different for 5 or more of the 18 items.
Regarding the variables of interest, I develop an index of self-esteem and an index
of self-control based on principal components. The self-esteem index used is based on
Rosenberg (1965) and the self-control index is based on Brown, et al. (1999); both
adapted by Palomar (2015) for the case of Mexico. The questions used have the fol-
lowing categorical answers: “always, “frequently, “rarely and “never. I aggregate the
answers into scales using principal components analysis, retaining only the first latent
factor. I present the results of the principal components analysis in Table 3.4. Column
1 presents the eigenvalues, Column 2 presents the questions used to build the scales,
and Column 3 shows the loading associated with each question. I then standardized
the value of the latent variable to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
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3.4 Estimation Strategy
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
This paper analyzes the effects of self-esteem and self-control on the differences
in the possession of assets reported by the wife and the husband from couples partic-
ipating in PROGRESA. Ideally, I would like to estimate the following equations for
the husband (h) and the wife (w):
Y hj - Y
r
j = β1hThj+β2hT
2
hj+γhXhj+ehj (1a)
Y wj - Y
r
j = β1wTwj+β2wT
2
wj+γwXwj+ewj (1b)
where Y ij is an index adding assets reported by individual i in house j, Y
r
j is and
index adding the real (truthful) number of assets within the household, Tij is the
self-esteem (or self-control) of the individual i in house j, X is a vector of observed
control variables, and e is an error term with mean zero. Unfortunately, I cannot
observe Y rj , however, I can still estimate all the parameters in equations (1a) and
(1b) by taking the differences, to obtain the following specification:
Y mj - Y
w
j =β1hThj - β1wTwj + β2hT
2
hj- β2wT
2
wj + γhXhj − γwXwj + ehj - ewj
(1c)
The parameters of interests are β1i and β2i. The estimate of β1i is a test for
the hypothesis of a linear relationship between the variable of interest (self-esteem
or self-control) and the real number of assets reported. For example, in the case of
self-esteem, if this coefficient is negative and statistically significant, it implies that
as self-esteem increases the difference between the assets reported by the individual
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and the real number of assets within the household coincide. Similarly, β2i tests
for the hypothesis that there is a non-linear relationship between the variable of in-
terest (self-esteem or self-control) and the dependent variable. For example, if this
coefficient is negative and statistically significant, then it implies that the difference
between the assets reported by the individual and the real number of assets within the
household coincide when the individual has higher levels or lower levels of self-esteem
(self-control).
A study of this type presents several econometric challenges. First, the measures
of self-esteem and self-control are proxy variables, so there is a potential problem of
measurement error. It is well-known that when regressors are measured with random
error, the parameters estimated tend to be biased toward zero. Second, self-esteem
and self-control may be correlated with other psychological variables not present in
the data. If such variables have a causal impact on the outcome of interest, then they
are in the error term e and their correlation with T will generate bias in the estimated
impacts of self-esteem or of self-control. On a more positive note, reverse causality is
likely to be minimal. In particular, there is little or no reason why the difference in
the assets reported can affect the self-esteem and self-control of the individuals.
To address the problem of omitted variable bias, I use two recently developed
bounding methodologies: one developed by Oster (2016) and the other by Krauth
(2016). Consider first Oster’s methodology. A common approach to evaluate robust-
ness to omitted variable bias is to include additional control variables on the right
hand side of the regression (Altonji et al., 2005). If such additions do not affect the
coefficient of interest, then this coefficient can be considered to be unlikely to be
biased. This strategy implicitly assumes that selection on observables is informative
about selection on unobservables. Oster formalizes this idea, and provides conditions
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for bounds and identification. Following the notation in Oster, the full model has the
form:
Y= β T+ X1 + X2 +. (2)
where T is the variable of interest, X1 contains the Jo observed control variables mul-
tiplied by their coefficients, i.e. X1 =
∑Jo
j=1 x
o
jγ
o
j , and X2 contains all Ju unobserved
variables multiplied by their coefficients, i.e. X2 =
∑Ju
j=1 x
u
j γ
u
j . Finally,  is a random
error that represents measurement error in Y and is uncorrelated with X1, X2, and
T. Oster (2016) suggests the following approach to account for omitted variable bias:
(1) Regress Y on T, and report the parameter on T, denoted by β0, and the R-
squared coefficient, denoted by R0.
(2) Regress Y on T and X1, and report the parameter on T, denoted by β˜, and
the R-squared coefficient, denoted by R˜.
(3) Define Rmax as the overall R-squared of the model, that is the R-squared
that would be obtained from a regression of Y on both observables (T, X1) and
unobservables (X2). Also, define δ to be a parameter that ensures the equality
Cov(T,X2)
V ar(X2)
= δCov(T,X1)
V ar(X1)
. In other words, this relationship formalizes the idea that
the magnitude and sign of the relationship between T and X1 provides some infor-
mation about the magnitude and sign of the relationship between T and X2.
3 Oster
shows that β∗ = β˜ − δ (β
0−β˜)(Rmax−R˜)
(R˜−R0) is a consistent estimator of the effect of T on
3For example, if −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1, then the variable of interest (T) is no more correlated with
unobservables (X2) than it is correlated with observables (X1). The case 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 has a similar
interpretation, with the additional assumption that the relationship between T and X1 have the
same sign as the relationship between T and X2.
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Y, β.
But, to estimate β∗, one needs estimates of δ and Rmax. Oster proposes as-
sumptions for δ and Rmax that allow one to determine whether β
∗ is different from
zero. Oster proposes that Rmax = min{1.3R˜, 1}, where the R˜ is defined as above.4
An alternative value for Rmax is given by Gonzalez and Miguel (2015), who used
Rmax = R˜ + (R˜ − R0). In addition to these two methods to choose the Rmax, I
will also use a conservative Rmax = 1. After determining the value of Rmax, Oster
suggests that β∗ be calculated for the following ranges of δ: 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.5 This al-
lows one to construct the set [β∗(δ = 0), β∗(δ = 1)] for different values of Rmax. If
this set excludes zero, the results from the controlled regressions can be considered
to be robust to omitted variable bias. In other words, the results indicate that β∗ 6= 0.
One benefit of Osters bounding methodology is that it provides an intuitive way
to arrive at a bounding strategy. However, her approach requires information for
two key parameters (Rmax and δ), and her method does not provide statistical infer-
ence about the bounding. Krauths bounding methodology, while more complex, has
two advantages over Osters methodology. First, it requires information only about
δ. Second, it provides inference about the bounding based on Imbens and Manski
(2004) confidence intervals. Krauths methodology proceeds using the following model:
Y= Y(T)= βTT + U (3)
Let UP = X1βX1 be the best linear predictor of U given X1 (a group of control
4The cut-off value of 1.3 is derived from a sample of 65 papers that have used randomized
controlled trials. She determined that using this cut-off allowed 90% of the randomized results to
continue being statistically significant.
5In addition, I will present the results for δ: −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0.
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variables):
βX1 = E(X
′
1X1)E(X
′
1Y )− βTE(X ′1X1)E(X ′1T )
Thus:
Y=βTT + X1βX1 + , where E(X
′
1 ) = 0 (4)
Krauth specifies δ such that:
Cov(T,)√
V ar()
= δ
Cov(T,X1βX1)√
V ar(X1βX1)
(5)
where δ ∈ ∆ = [δL, δH ], i.e. in a finite interval.
Notice that δ can be rewritten as:
δ(βT ) =
corr(T,)
corr(T,X1βX1)
=
corr(T,Y−βTT−X1βX1(βT ))
corr(T,X1βX1(βT ))
(5’)
Then, Krauth shows the following properties of δ(βT ):
i. δ(βT ) exists and is differentiable for all βT 6= β∞ (the value of βT at which
corr(T,X1βX1(βT )) = 0).
ii. There is a δ∞ = limβT→∞δ(βT ) = limβT→−∞δ(βT ) and δ
∞ ≥ 0, i.e. the limit
as βT approaches positive or negative infinity is δ
∞.
iii. Notice that from i and ii, δ(βT ) takes the form of a hyperbolic funtion. Thus,
if given the relative correlation restriction ∆ = [δL, δH ], the bounds [βLT , β
H
T ] can be
found by inverting δ(βT ).
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See Krauth (2016) for the details of how his approach allows him to obtain the
Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence interval for the identified set.
3.5 Results
To analyze the effects of self-esteem and self-control on explaining the differences
in the assets reported by the wife and the husband, I first present results using an
OLS regression, and then apply the two bounding strategies.
Column 1 of Table 3.5 presents a linear model (OLS regression) of the impact
of husbands’ self-esteem and wives’ self-esteem, and their squares on the difference in
the assets reported. I control for husband’s age, wife’s age, and their squares, hus-
band’s years of school, wife’s years of school, and their squares. The results show that
a one standard deviation increase in the square of husband’s self-esteem decreases the
index of differences in assets (this index has a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one) by 0.065 standard deviations.
To check the robustness of this result, column 2 incorporates the following addi-
tional controls for the wife and the husband: “error in the number of dependents”,
perception of households level of poverty, alcohol consumption, and living in a rural
area. “Error in number of dependents” is a dummy variable that measures inconsis-
tencies in the number of households members reported. This variable was generated
by first asking about the number of household members. Then, after some questions
were answered, information was asked regarding the number of children less than 12
years old and the number of adults above 65 years old. The variable “error in the
51
number of dependents” takes the value of one when the number of children less than
12 years old plus the number of adults more than 65 years old is above the number
of members originally reported, and it takes the value of zero otherwise. The idea
behind this variable is to try to identify cases when the respondents are not paying
enough attention when answering the survey.
The questions regarding the consumption of alcohol was included because this
question reflects a potentially embarrassing situation. So, individuals who reveal
having a problem of alcohol consumption potentially have a strong self-esteem. Fi-
nally, a question was included regarding the perception of households level of poverty.
In particular, the question asks: “comparing your home with all Mexican households,
and on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is the poorest and 10 the richest, what number
would you give to your home?” Remember that the survey was collected among fam-
ilies participating in PROGRESA, which are living in poverty. So, if the wife or the
husband respond that they are in the highest deciles, one might expect that some of
the information they are revealing may be inconsistent. After including these con-
trols, the square of husbands self-esteem has the same effect (-0.065) and continues
to be statistically significant.
Column 3 of Table 3.5 presents a linear model (OLS regression) of the impact of
the husband’s self-control and the wife’s self-control, and their squares, on the differ-
ence in the assets reported. Using the same controls as those in column 1 of Table
3.5, the results show that a one standard deviation increase in the square of hus-
band’s self-control decreases by 0.62 standard deviations the index of the differences
in assets; and, this coefficient is statistically significant. To check the robustness of
this result, column 4 incorporates the control variables used in Table 3.5 column 2.
This leads to an increase in the effect of the square of husbands self-control (-0.069),
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which continues to be statistically significant.
Column 5, presents a linear model of the impact of the eight variables of interest
(self-esteem, self-control, self-esteem to the square, and self-control to the square for
both spouses) on the difference in the assets reported. Using the same controls as
those in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.5, the results confirm that the coefficients associ-
ated with the square of husbands self-esteem and the square of husbands self-control
continue being statistically significant.
While the coefficients associated with self-esteem and self-control appear to be
robust to adding control variables, it is also possible that these estimates are affected
by omitted variable bias. In particular, Oster (2016) shows that just adding controls,
which is a common strategy, is not enough to avoid omitted variable bias. Table 3.6
presents results using Oster’s methodology to analyze the robustness of the results
presented in Table 3.5 Column 3 regarding self-esteem and self-control.
Panel A presents the results under the assumption that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, i.e. assuming
that the relationship between the variable of interest and the (aggregated) controls
has the same sign as the relationship between the variable of interest and the (aggre-
gated) unobservables. The Column 1 estimates bounds using the value of the Rmax
proposed by Oster (2016), which yields a tight bounds estimate of [-0.074, -0.065].
To check the robustness of this estimate of the bounds, I also estimate bounds using
the Rmax proposed by Gonzalez and Miguel (2015) in Column 2. The bounding es-
timated is [-0.093, -0.065]. To further check the robustness of the results, I use the
extreme value that Rmax = 1, which yields a bounding estimate of [-1.106, -0.065]
in Column 3 of Table 3.6. Thus, when the correlation of the self-esteem with the
observed control variables is assumed to be the same sign as the correlation with the
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unobserved control variables, Oster’s method shows that the result on self-esteem in
Table 3.5 is robust.
Panel B presents the results when −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0.6 Using the Rmax proposed by Os-
ter, the bounding estimated is [-0.065, -0.055]. Using the Rmax proposed by Gonzalez
and Miguel, the bounding is [-0.065, -0.036]. Finally, using a conservative Rmax = 1,
the bound is [-0.065, 1.037].
Table 3.6, Column 4 panel A, presents analogous results using Krauth’s method-
ology. Assuming that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the bounding associated with self-esteem is [-0.804,
-0.065]; and the 95% confidence interval associated with this estimate is (-1.070, -
0.935). Thus, the hypothesis of no effects of self-esteem on explaining the difference
in the assets reported by the wife and the husband is not rejected. If instead one as-
sumes that −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, the bounding associated with self-esteem is [-0.065, -0.006].
The confidence interval at the 95% level associated with self-esteem is (-0.114, 0.047)
which fails to reject the hypothesis of an impact of self-esteem. Finally, I present the
value of the minimum δ for which the bounds include zero; this value is 1.86. As a
consequence, regardless of the methodology used, the impact of self-esteem (i.e. the
the square of husbands self-esteem) is not robust to the problem of omitted variable
bias.
Panels C and D present the results for the square of husband’s self-control. Under
the assumption that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, Column 1 estimates bounds using the value of the
Rmax proposed by Oster (2016), which yields a tight bounds estimate of [-0.081, -
0.069]. To check the robustness of this estimate of the bounds, I also estimate bounds
6The case −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0 assumes that the correlation between T and X1 has different sign than
the correlation between T and X2.
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using the Rmax proposed by Gonzalez and Miguel (2015) in Column 2. The bounding
estimated is [-0.106, -0.069]. To further check the robustness of the results, I use the
extreme value that Rmax = 1, which yields a bounding estimate of [-1.521, -0.069]
in Column 3 of Table 3.6. Thus, when the correlation of the square of husbands
self-control with the observed control variables is assumed to be the same sign as
the correlation with the unobserved control variables, Oster’s method shows that the
result on self-control in Table 3.5 is robust.
Panel D presents the results when −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0. Using the Rmax proposed by Os-
ter, the bounding estimated is [-0.069, -0.057]. Using the Rmax proposed by Gonzalez
and Miguel, the bounding is [-0.069, -0.032]. Finally, using a conservative Rmax = 1,
the bound is [-0.069, 1.383]. To sum up, when the correlation between the square
of husband self-control and the observed control variables has the opposite sign of
the correlation of the square of husband self-control with the unobserved variables,
the effect of self-control on the differences in the assets reported is not robust when
Oster’s bounding methodology is used.
Table 3.6, Column 4 panel C, presents analogous results using Krauth’s method-
ology. Assuming that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, the bounding associated with the square of husband
self-control is [-0.605, -0.069]; and the 95% confidence interval associated with this
estimate is (-0.786, 1.028). Thus, the hypothesis of no effect of self-control on explain-
ing the difference in the assets reported by the wife and the husband is not rejected.
If instead one assumes that −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0, the bounding associated with self-control is
[-0.069, 0.017]. The confidence interval at the 95% level associated with self-control
is (-0.129, 0.104) which again rejects the hypothesis of an impact of self-control. Fi-
nally, I present the value of the minimum δ for which the bounds include zero; this
value is 0.57. As a consequence, regardless of the methodology used, the impact of
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self-control (i.e. the square of husbands self-control) is not robust to the problem of
omitted variable bias.
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3.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
I use a unique dataset that asks the same questions of the wife and of the hus-
band regarding the possession of assets; and I find discrepancies in the possession
of assets reported between the spouses. Using Ordinary Least Squares, the results
show that husbands self-esteem and self-control are important variables that affect
such discrepancies. The results are robust to the problem of omitted variables when
Oster’s bounding methodology is implemented, but not when Krauth’s methodology
is implemented.
Researchers and policy makers need to be careful about how the data are used. For
example, when using data to construct a proxy means test, policy makers recognize
that individuals have incentives to underreport income. As a consequence, they use
variables such as the possession of assets to proxy the real income of the households.
It is assumed that there are no incentives to misreport these variables. Yet, this paper
presents evidence that contradicts this assumption. In this sense, it is necessary to
implement strategies that can provide incentives to individuals to accurately report
the data.
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Table 3.1: χ2 Tests Between Benford’s Law and Some Items
Variable χ2 man χ2 woman
Income 167.6 *** 157.2 ***
Light bulbs 523.3 *** 623.43 ***
Number of rooms 599.4 *** 619.7 ***
*** indicates 99% significantly different from Benford’s Law.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Husband’s report of Wife’s report of Percentage that Husband: Yes Husband: No
possession of (%): possession of (%): do not match (%) Wife: No Wife: Yes
Music device 59.7 57.5 32.9 17.5 15.4
Bicycle 42.7 36.5 30.2 18.3 11.9
Farm animals 29.6 31.0 25.6 12.1 13.5
Washing Machine 42.7 43.1 24.0 11.8 12.2
Gas stove 20.0 21.8 22.9 10.7 12.2
Refrigerator 63.5 65.1 21.3 9.8 11.5
Living room 23.7 23.0 18.7 9.7 9.0
Automobile 19.4 16.2 13.7 8.5 5.2
Landline 15.7 16.6 13.5 6.3 7.2
Photographic camera 8.4 6.6 10.9 6.4 4.5
Other land 8.3 6.5 10.7 6.3 4.4
Television 90.9 90.6 8.4 4.4 4.0
Machinery 5.5 3.0 7.0 4.8 2.2
Apartment to rent 4.3 3.7 7.0 3.8 3.2
Motorcycle 5.2 5.5 5.6 2.6 3.0
Savings 1.9 3.6 4.9 1.5 3.4
Local business 2.7 2.8 3.6 1.7 1.9
Canoe or boat 2.0 1.7 2.2 1.2 1.0
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Table 3.3: Distribution Across Households for the Number of Assets for which There
Is No Match
Number Freq. Percent. Cum.
0 121 13.80 13.80
1 154 17.56 31.36
2 190 21.66 53.02
3 157 17.90 70.92
4 124 14.14 85.06
5 55 6.27 91.33
6 41 4.68 96.01
7 24 2.74 98.75
8 4 0.46 99.20
9 3 0.34 99.54
10 1 0.11 99.66
11 1 0.11 99.77
12 2 0.23 100.00
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Table 3.4: Latent Variable Scales
Scale Name Scale Survey Question Factor
Loadings
Self-esteem [1] I am satisfied with myself 0.3856
Eigenvalue: 2.4 [2] I am able to do things as well as others 0.4345
[3] I am a worthy person 0.4741
[4] I have good qualities 0.4620
[5] I have a positive attitude toward myself 0.4736
Self-control [1] You make decisions carefully 0.3158
Eigenvalue: 4.6 [2] You finish what you start 0.3203
[3] You have a lot of will power 0.3160
[4] You evaluate your progress when you set a goal 0.3341
[5] You can mantain a plan from start to finish 0.3337
[6] You think before you react 0.3088
[7] You keep your goals 0.3297
[8] You strive to achieve your goals 0.3518
[9] You comply with what is deemed necessary in order to achieve your goal 0.2882
[10] You overcome fear when facing a challenge 0.2530
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Table 3.5: OLS Estimates: Effects of Self-esteem and Self-control on the Index of
Differences in Assests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep Var: Index of differences in
assets
Husband’s Self-esteem -0.068 -0.064 -0.062
(0.050) (0.049) (0.045)
(Husband’s Self-esteem)2 -0.065∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
Wife’s Self-esteem 0.013 0.012 0.013
(0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
(Wife’s Self-esteem)2 0.038 0.038 0.042
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Husband’s Self-control -0.065 -0.056 -0.050
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
(Husband’s Self-control)2 -0.062∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Wife’s Self-control -0.031 -0.042 -0.042
(0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
(Wife’s Self-control)2 -0.030 -0.033 -0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Husband’s Age -0.045∗∗ -0.039∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.043∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
(Husband’s Age)2 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wife’s Age 0.039 0.037 0.032 0.034 0.037
(0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
(Wife’s Age)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Husband’s Years of School 0.033 0.037 0.022 0.029 0.039
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
(Husband’s Years of School)2 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wife’s Years of School 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
(Wife’s Years of School)2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Other Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04
Observations 855 837 857 839 803
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
The other controls are: living in a rural area, wife and husband’s perception of household’s
level of poverty, wife and husband’s error in the number of dependents, and alcohol
consumption.
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Table 3.6: Bounding Methodology: Effects of Husbands Self-esteem and Self-control
on the Index of Differences in Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oster Gonzalez and Miguel Conservative Krauth
(2016) (2015) (Rmax = 1) (2016)
Panel A : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
(Husband’s Self-esteem)2 [-0.074, -0.065] [-0.093, -0.065] [-1.166, -0.065] [-0.804, -0.065]
(95% CI) (-1.070, 0.935)
(90% CI) (-1.027, 0.891)
Panel B : −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0
(Husband’s Self-esteem)2 [-0.065, -0.055] [-0.065, -0.036] [-0.065, 1.037] [-0.065, -0.006]
(95% CI) (-0.114, 0.047)
(90% CI) (-0.106, 0.038)
Minimum δ for which 1.86
bounds include zero
Panel C : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
(Husband’s Self-control)2 [-0.081, -0.069] [-0.106, -0.069] [-1.521, -0.069] [-0.605, -0.069]
(95% CI) (-0.786, 1.028)
(90% CI) (-0.757, 0.920)
Panel D : −1 ≤ δ ≤ 0
(Husband’s Self-control)2 [-0.069, -0.057] [-0.069, -0.032] [-0.069, 1.383] [-0.069, 0.017]
(95% CI) (-0.129, 0.104)
(90% CI) (-0.119, 0.090)
Minimum δ for which 0.57
bounds include zero
Intervals in brackets are the bounds, while the intervals in parentheses are confidence in-
tervals. The control variables are: Husband’s Self-esteem, Wife’s Self-esteem, Husband’s
Self-control, Wife’s Self-control, Husband’s Age, Wife’s Age, Husband’s Age to the square,
Wife’s Age to the square, Husband’s Years of School, Wife’s Years of School, Husband’s
Years of School to the square, Wife’s Years of School to the square, wife and husband’s
perception of household’s level of poverty, wife and husband’s error in the number of de-
pendents, and alcohol consumption.
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Chapter 4
Are Disaster Funds Enough to
Smooth Consumption?
with Juan Enrique Huerta-Wong1 and Julieth Santamaria2 3
4.1 Introduction
Natural disasters worldwide have increased considerably since the 1970s, affect-
ing on average over 200 million people every year (Leaning and Guha-Sapir, 2013).
Natural disasters may greatly reduce children’s human capital accumulation by af-
fecting prices, assets, and the consumption of families. Yet, the impact of natural
disasters on consumption is widely debated. While economic theory predicts that
individuals can maintain their levels of consumption against income shocks,4 there is
evidence that this is not always the case when facing a natural disaster (Kazianga
and Udry, 2006).
What kind of public policies can be implemented to protect families’ consumption
1Assistant Professor, Centro de Investigacio´n e Inteligencia Econo´mica, UPAEP.
2PhD Student, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
3Juan Enrique Huerta-Wong, Julieth Santamaria, and Adan Silverio Murillo contributed equally
to this work.
4Under the assumptions that insurance and/or credit markets function well.
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from a natural disaster? One possibility is through the use of insurance. In particular,
governments can use disaster funds, i.e. save resources ex-ante for post-disaster use
(De Janvry, Del Valle and Sadoulet, 2016) or use catastrophe (CAT) bonds to insure
against the consequences of a natural disaster (Borensztein, Cavallo, and Jeanne,
2017). To the best of our knowledge, Mexico was the first developing country to
use disaster funds and catastrophe bonds through the Fund for Natural Disasters
(FONDEN). FONDEN resources are used to provide immediately supplies of food,
medicines, cleaning supplies and toiletries to the households affected, and also pro-
vides resources for the reconstruction of housing and public infrastructure affected.
De Janvry, et al. (2016) find evidence that FONDEN increases local economic activ-
ity between 2 and 4 percent in the year following the disaster. Thus, this program can
be an important factor mitigating the effects of natural disasters in the medium term.
But, can FONDEN smooth the consumption of families affected by a natural
disaster in the short term? To answer this question, we exploit the occurrence of
Hurricane Earl, which had a large impact on the state of Puebla, Mexico, in 2016.
This disaster happened unexpectedly in areas that do not usually experience hurri-
canes. Survey data were collected from municipalities within the state of Puebla that
are comparable in terms of their ranking in the Human Development Index.5 Huachi-
nango and Tlaola are treatment municipalities (affected by the hurricane and received
resources through the FONDEN) while Palmar de Bravo and Juan C. Bonilla are the
comparison municipalities. We use a difference-in-differences estimation procedure to
test the hypothesis that the use of FONDEN can protect families’ consumption when
they are affected by a hurricane. We find that the quantity consumed of key food
items diminishes. In particular, of the 12 items analyzed, we observe a decrease in
5The Human Development Index is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and per-
capita income, which is used to rank countries regarding human development.
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the consumption of beans, lemons, sugar, beef, and chicken.
A large body of literature has analyzed the effects of negative income shocks on
households’ behavior. This literature was initially motivated by the neoclassical life
cycle model, also known as the permanent income hypothesis, which suggests that
individuals tend to smooth their consumption over their lifetime by saving when they
have income surpluses and dis-saving during hard times (Modigliani and Brumberg,
1954). However, the literature has also found that precautionary saving is very rare,
particularly for uneducated households and individuals in the lower tail of the income
distribution (Bernheim and Scholz, 1993; Browning and Lusardi, 1996). After natu-
ral disasters occur, households react in different ways to smooth their consumption
and recover from the loss. For example, families can choose to sell assets in order to
smooth their consumption, or they may reduce their present consumption in order
to keep their assets. Hoddinott (2006) finds evidence that poorer households tend
to smooth their assets rather than smooth their consumption. Consistent with this,
Fafchamps, Udry, and Czkas (1998) find that households in West Africa do not sell
assets after a severe drought. Their hypothesis is that households choose to protect
their productive investment because the low market price prevailing at the time of
the sale would not compensate for the loss.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the use of disasters funds, pro-
viding evidence that a natural disaster fund (FONDEN) is not always sufficient to
protect families’ consumption (at least in the short run). In addition, the results pro-
vide no evidence that the hurricane affected families differently depending on their
wealth. These results imply the need to review the way in which FONDEN is oper-
ating:
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i. It is necessary to analyze whether the quantity and periodicity with which food
is distributed is the most appropriate. According to the Mexican government, about
2,196 families were affected by Hurricane Earl. The government reported that food
baskets were distributed as follows: 1,200 in August 7th; 1,200 in August 11th; and
2,196 in August 26th. This reflects that not all the affected families were served and
that the periodicity of delivery of food was not regular.
iii. It is important to establish mechanisms of accountability and transparency.
The survey includes a question regarding whether families received help from natural
disasters. Of the 327 families surveyed (14% of the total families affected), only 6
families reported receiving government support as a consequence of the natural dis-
aster. Some possible explanations are: a) the families are underreporting the aid
received from the government in order to continue receiving benefits; b) the families
surveyed are part of the group that did not receive help from the government; or c) it
is possible that these families did not receive support from the government. In order
to know how the support is granted, it is necessary that FONDEN report a list of
the families served. This will generate transparency and avoid possible situations of
corruption in the delivery of food to the affected families.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the geograph-
ical location and impact of Hurricane Earl on Puebla and we explain in more detail
the FONDEN program. We then describe the data, present descriptive statistics,
and explain the identification strategy. Finally, we describe the results and give some
insights about their policy implications.
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4.2 Background
Mexico is among the 30 countries that are most exposed to two types of natural
disasters: hurricanes and earthquakes. The population that is most vulnerable to
these natural disasters represents around 27% of the country (INEGI, 2013). A nat-
ural disaster can greatly reduce human capital accumulation and, as a consequence,
decrease the possibility of social mobility. Its first effect is through income, which
clearly has the potential to affect consumption and education. While economic theory
predicts that individuals can maintain their levels of consumption against temporary
income shocks, there is evidence that this is not always the case (Kazianga and Udry,
2006). On the other hand, other studies have found that natural disasters affect stu-
dents’ school attendance (Jensen 2000, Cameron and Worswick 2001). One consensus
from these studies is that families who are affected most are less likely to have insur-
ance coverage (formal or informal), and are relatively poor.
4.2.1 The Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN)
In response to the vulnerability of Mexico to natural disasters, the Mexican Gov-
ernment established the Fondo de Prevencio´n de Desastres Naturales (Fund for Natu-
ral Disasters Prevention, FOPREDEN) and the Fondo de Desastres Naturales (Fund
for Natural Disasters, FONDEN). FOPREDEN is a program intended to generate ac-
tions for the prevention and reduction of risks due to natural disasters. FONDEN is a
financial instrument by which the Mexican government allocates resources ex-ante for
post-disaster immediate attention to the population affected and for reconstruction
of the damaged infrastructure. FONDEN is composed of two main instruments: the
Emergency Relief Fund and the Reconstruction Program. The former serves the pop-
ulation immediately by supplying food, medicines, cleaning supplies and toiletries,
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and the latter provides resources for the reconstruction of affected housing and public
infrastructure. For the fiscal year 2016, FOPREDEN received $358,718,014 pesos
(US$19,928,778) and FONDEN received $8,035,987,256 pesos (US$446,443,736). If
this funding is insufficient, additional resources can be transferred from other federal
programs.
4.2.2 Hurricane Earl in Puebla
Hurricane Earl was the deadliest Atlantic Hurricane to hit Mexico since Hur-
ricane Stan in 2005. It started on August 2 and dissipated on August 6 of 2016.
According to media reports, 54 individuals died, of which 41 were from the state
of Puebla. This number exceeds the 33 deaths for Mexico as a whole reported for
all 10 hurricanes that occurred in 2014 and 2015. According to the Global Catastro-
phe Recap (2016), the damage associated with Earl is estimated to be US$132 million.
Given the gravity of the hurricane, the Mexican government declared a state of
emergency in three municipalities of Puebla: Huachinango, Tlaola, and Xicotepec.
According to information provided by the Mexican government, 8,784 individuals
were affected (around 2,000 families). The government distributed “despensas” (a
food basket containing sugar, rice, beans, oil, corn, coffee, cookies, tuna, sardines,
among other supplies) as follows: 1,200 in August 7th, 1,200 in August 11th, and
2,196 in August 26th. The total cost spent on food was $1,603,382 pesos (US$ 89,076).
Finally, according to the media, the Mexican government received US$200,000 from
the Inter-American Development Bank to purchase food for the families affected.6
6In addition, the government spent: $764,208 pesos (US$42,456) on 8,784 blankets, $2,304,851
pesos (US$128,047) on 8,784 mats, $524,775 pesos (US$29,154) on 5,592 toiletries kits, $384,906
pesos (US$21,383) on 2,196 sets of cleaning supplies, $552,960 (US$30,720) on 76,800 bottles of
water, and $8,836,211 pesos (US$490,900) on medicines.
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4.3 Data
To analyze the effects of Hurricane Earl, we use a unique dataset that was col-
lected in affected municipalities in Puebla after the disaster took place. The data are
part of Mexico’s Survey of Social Mobility in Disaster Zones (SSMDZ). The survey
selects locations that were affected in the current year, but were not affected by a
hurricane or other natural disaster in the previous four years. In addition, the survey
includes a comparison group that was neither affected by the current natural disaster
nor by any other natural disaster in the last four years. The comparison group should
be located close to the affected area, and should have a Human Development Index
that is similar to those of the affected municipalities before the natural disaster took
place. The SSMDZ data contain information on two affected municipalities: Tlaola
and Huauchinango. Data were also collected from two municipalities that are used
as controls: Palmar de Bravo and Juan C. Bonilla.7
Table 4.1 displays descriptive statistics regarding the number of members in the
household and the possession of assets. As mentioned before, the treatment and
comparison groups were selected to ensure that the municipalities were as similar as
possible in terms of their location and the Human Development Index. However, the
table displays baseline differences between the treatment group and the comparison
group. In particular, Table 4.1 shows that, previous to the shock, households in the
comparison group tend to have more assets than households affected by the hurricane.
Regarding consumption and prices, the survey contains information about 12
7Puebla was founded on December 21, 1823 and consists of a total of 217 municipalities.
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items: corn tortillas, beans, tomatoes, lemons, bananas, sugar, beef, chicken, eggs,
milk, alcohol, and cigarettes. All individuals were asked the following question about
consumption before the hurricane: did your household consume (item) in (month)?
If the individuals answered yes, then they were asked information about the quan-
tity consumed and the price. Finally, similar questions were asked of the individuals
regarding consumption and prices after the hurricane. The hurricane affected the
treatment group municipalities from August 2 to August 6, 2016. The survey was
implemented in September 2016, and the respondents were also asked to recall infor-
mation about prices and consumption from the month of July 2016.
The response rates regarding consumption and prices before the hurricane Earl
are presented in first Column of Table 4.2. Regarding the question about consuming a
particular product (“Did your household consume...?”), the percentage of households
with no response (i.e. did not answer the question) ranges from 1.8% for sugar to
2.7% for beans. From those individuals who answered that they did consume such
items, almost all the individuals responded with the quantity that they consumed
(see Column 4 in Table 4.2).8
Table 4.3 presents the rates of consumption of these goods before the hurricane,
separately for “treatment” and “control” municipalities, and we can observe impor-
8These high rates of response can be explained by important changes to the instrument used to
collect the information. For example, a similar survey collected information in the aftermath of the
Hurricane Odile, which affected the state of Baja California Sur. This hurricane affected that area
between September 10 and September 24, 2014. The survey was implemented during June of 2015,
and the people surveyed were asked to recall information regarding the month of August 2014. Of
the people who answered positively consumption, almost half of them were not able to respond the
quantity consumed. So, it is clear that the time period for which the people were asked to recall
information matters. Another potential explanation could be the length of the questionnaire. In
the case of the survey collected for Hurricane Earl, it was decided to shorten the questionnaire. For
example, when the individuals surveyed answer the consumption module, they have were asked 153
questions in the case of the Hurricane Odile, but only 82 questions in the case of the Hurricane Earl.
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tant differences in the patterns of consumption. For example, 75% of the households
in the treatment localities reported consuming corn tortillas, compared to 91% for
the control group. Another example is the consumption of alcohol, where 24% of the
households in the treatment group reported consuming alcohol, while the percentage
is only 14% in the control group. Table 4.4 presents the quantities9 consumed in the
treatment and control groups. Depending on the item, some goods are consumed
more in the treatment group while others are consumed more in the control group.
For example, the control group consumes an average of 6.98 kg of corn tortilla per
week per household vs 4.32 kg in the treatment group; however, for sugar, the control
group consumes 1.92 kg vs 2.57 kg in the treatment group. Finally, Table 4.5 presents
information regarding prices. In general, the families in the treatment group report
higher prices than those in the control group; yet, there are some exceptions, such as
alcohol or cigarettes.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the FONDEN resources are
sufficient to smooth the consumption of the families affected by the Hurricane Earl
in Puebla, Mexico. Ideally, we would like to calculate the effects of the FONDEN on
consumption by comparing the actual outcome with the outcome in the absence of
the shock. Because this is impossible, we have to rely on the construction of a proper
counterfactual. Since Hurricane Earl’s trajectory was exogenous, households spared
by the storm constitute a natural control group. Hence, the approach is to compare
the changes in the outcome of interest in the localities directly hit by Hurricane Earl
and where the FONDEN resources were used to the changes that occurred in the
9Unconditional on positive consumption.
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control group localities.
We use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine the effect on house-
hold consumption, assets, and prices:
Yit = β0 + β1Aftert + β2Hurricanei + β3 (Aftert ∗Hurricanei) +Xiθi + eit
where Yit is the outcome of interest for household i at time t. We look at various
types of outcomes such as consumption and prices of a basket of goods that is relevant
for the Mexican context; Aftert takes the value of 1 in the period after the shock;
Hurricanei takes the value of 1 in the municipalities affected by the natural disaster
and zero otherwise; Xi is a set of control variables. Notice that the coefficient of inter-
est is β3. It estimates the combined effect that the hurricane and the implementation
of FONDEN have in the treated municipalities compared to the control group. More
specifically, without FONDEN we expect β3 < 0, but we want to see whether, with
FONDEN, β3 = 0. To identify the causal effect, the above difference-in-differences
(DID) estimator must satisfies the following:
1. The additive structure imposed is correct.
2. cov(eit, Aftert ∗Hurricanei) = 0.
The last assumption is known as the parallel-trend assumption, and it means that
the outcome variables of the treatment and comparison groups followed the same
trend over time before the hurricane took place. In other words, the unobserved
characteristics that create a gap between measured treatment and control outcomes
are assumed to be time invariant. Given that we only have two data points, we can-
not test this hypothesis. However, these municipalities are located close to each other
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and they are all located in the State of Puebla. Therefore, we think that it is likely
that in absence of the hurricane, the outcomes of interest for the four municipalities
followed a similar trend.
Although a natural disaster is unexpected and non-manipulable by construction,
the initial conditions of the families are likely to influence the subsequent consump-
tion path. For example, it is possible that wealthy families recover faster from the
hurricane using their savings or other assets to smooth their consumption. For this
reason, we include an additional robustness check using a Kernel propensity matching
technique combined with a DID. We use the predicted probability of being affected
by the hurricane (the propensity score) to match the control municipalities. The
propensity score is estimated using a probit model where the initial conditions are
the assets holding of the families in the period before the hurricane. The average
impact can be written as:
DDi = (Y
T
i2 − Y i1T )−
∑
j∈C w(i, j)(Y
C
j2 − Y Cj1 )
where w(i,j) is the weight using a Kernel matching in which all non-participants
are used as comparison communes and weights are assigned according to a kernel
function of the predicted propensity score.
Another potential source of endogeneity bias could be characteristics of the mu-
nicipalities that might affect consumption outcomes. For example, economic opportu-
nities might result in different consumption outcomes across the municipalities, even
in the absence of the hurricane. Thus, as a robustness check, we will conduct a fixed
effects regression at the municipality level.
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4.5 Results
We analyze the effects on quantities consumed and prices of the following goods:
corn tortillas, beans, tomatoes, lemons, bananas, sugar, beef, chicken, eggs, milk,
alcohol, and cigarettes. Table 4.6, Column 3, presents estimates of the impact on
consumption decisions (a dummy variable for the question “Did your household con-
sume...?”). The estimates show that the hurricane affected negatively, and statisti-
cally significantly, the consumption of beans (-0.14), lemons (-0.06), sugar (-0.04),
beef (-0.02) and chicken (-0.02). Column 5 presents the results regarding the quanti-
ties consumed, where significantly negative impacts are found only for beans (-.288).
Regarding prices, they decrease for all the items analyzed except cigarettes, and these
decreases are statistically significant for all items except sugar and milk (Column 7).
In particular, a statistically significant decrease is observed in the prices of the follow-
ing items: tortillas (-0.94 or 9.5%), beans (-1.91 or 7.3%), tomatoes (-3.52 or 26.3%),
lemons (-1.68 or 14.5%), bananas (-1.33 or 13.8%), beef (-4.86 or 8.8%), chicken (-4.34
or 9.9%), and eggs (-1.09 or 5.8%).10
As a robustness check, we use a kernel propensity matching to identify a sample
of households in the comparison group that had asset holdings similar to those of
the households in the treatment group before the hurricane took place. Table B1
(Appendix) show the balancing test before and after the matching. There are many
significant differences in asset holdings for the unmatched sample. This is also in line
with the descriptive statistics provided in Table 4.1, which pointed out some differ-
ences between households in the treatment and the comparison groups. After the
matching is implemented, most of the differences between the matched sample of the
10Finally a joint test was conducted for consumption, quantities consumed, and prices. We reject
the null hypothesis that the effect of the hurricane on consumption and quantities consumed is not
statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. For prices, we reject the null
hypothesis of no effect of the hurricane at the 5 percent level.
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treatment and control groups are no longer significant. And even for those variables
for which there are still differences such as DVD, water heater, cellphone, and piped
water, there is a large reduction in the gap after the matching.
The results of the DID using the matched sample are displayed in Table 4.7. As
compared to the basic specification in Table 4.6, the effects on consumption of beans,
lemon, sugar, beef, and chicken remain significant and are even slightly larger. On
quantities consumed, there is still a negative effect of the hurricane on the quantity
consumed of beans, and we also find a negative and significant effect on the quantity
of lemons. Finally, the effect of the hurricane on prices remains negative for most of
the products except for sugar and milk, neither of which were significant in the basic
specification. Thus, we find the same results even after implementing the propensity
score matching.11
To confirm the results presented above regarding consumption and prices, we de-
cided to use municipality fixed effects. The idea is to capture characteristics of the
municipalities that might affect our variables of interest even in the absence of the
Hurricane and the resources of FONDEN, such as the population of the villages, eco-
nomic development, and institutional efforts to prevent natural disasters. Table 4.8
reproduces Table 4.6 using municipality fixed effects. We do not observe substantial
changes with respect the results presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.7.12
11A joint test was conducted for consumption, quantities consumed, and prices. We reject the
null hypothesis that the effect of the hurricane on consumption and quantities consumed is not
statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. For prices, we reject the null
hypothesis of no effect of the hurricane at the 5 percent level.
12A joint test was conducted for consumption, quantities consumed, and prices. We reject the
null hypothesis that the effect of the hurricane on consumption and quantities consumed is not
statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. For prices, we reject the null
hypothesis of no effect of the hurricane at the 5 percent level.
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It is possible that the changes in consumption reflect only substitution effects, so
that it is possible that aggregate household consumption was not affected. To analyze
this possibility, the consumption of the twelve items was aggregated, i.e. we generate
a new variable, which adds the dummy variables regarding consumption, and which
maximum value is twelve. The result is presented in Table 4.9, Column 1, and we still
observe a decrease in consumption that is statistically significant (-0.302). Column
2 presents the aggregate consumption results that exclude alcohol and cigarettes.
The results continue to be statistically significant, and a slight increase is observed
(-0.314). Finally, column 3 presents the result when we add the quantities consumed
excluding alcohol and cigarettes.13 it is observed a decrease in the quantity consumed
that is statistically significant (-0.581)
There is evidence that natural disasters can affect families differently depending on
their levels of wealth (Carter and Lybbert, 2012). In order to verify this hypothesis,
using the information regarding the sixteen assets captured in the survey, we generate
an index of wealth using principal component analysis. This index goes from -3.16
(less assets) to 6.68 (more assets). Then we estimate the following model using
difference-in-differences estimation:
Yit = β0 + β1Aftert + β2Hurricanei + β3Wealth0i + β4AftertHurricanei +
β5AftertWealth0i+β6HurricaneiWealth0i+β7AftertHurricaneiWealth0i+Xiθi+eit
where Y is the variable of interest (consumption); After is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 after the shock; Hurricanei is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 for the affected areas, and zero otherwise; Wealth0i is a variable that
measures the wealth of the families before the hurricane; and X is a group of control
variables. In this specification our coefficient of interest is β7.
13For the case of milk, it is assumed that 1kg= 1 liter.
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Table 4.10 presents results regarding the probability of consuming and the quan-
tity consumed when the wealth of the families previous to the hurricane is taken into
account. Column 3 presents the results when the consumption is analyzed. For the
twelve items analyzed, we observe a statistically significant effect (0.029) only for the
consumption of beef. Given that the sign of the effect is positive, it implies that
households with low levels of assets were more affected. The results regarding the
quantities consumed are presented in Column 5. In this case, the only coefficient
that is statistically significant at the 10% level is associated with the consumption
of chicken: -0.048. The negative sign of the effect implies that households with high
level of assets were most affected. Finally, we conducted a joint test, and we were not
able to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of different levels of wealth on consump-
tion and quantities consumed. Thus, it appears that the original level of wealth did
not affect the decrease observed in the households consumption, i.e. we do not find
evidence of heterogeneity.
Although families received support from FONDEN and there was a drop in prices,
these factors were not enough to smooth the consumption of households affected by
the hurricane. In addition, we do not find evidence that the hurricane affected fami-
lies differently depending on their wealth. Regarding the decrease observed in prices,
it is possible a consequence of an important decrease in income that affected the de-
mand for food. Yet, other potential hypotheses are plausible, such as, that markets
are not well integrated or the families sold at a lower price the items included in the
“despensa” (for example, it could be the case of products that families do not like),
causing a drop in prices.
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the ability of a disaster fund program (FONDEN) to smooth
the consumption of families affected by Hurricane Earl in Puebla, Mexico. In partic-
ular, the analysis examines quantities consumed and prices for the following goods:
corn tortillas, beans, tomatoes, lemons, bananas, sugar, beef, chicken, eggs, milk,
alcohol, and cigarettes. The results show a decrease in the consumption of five of the
twelve goods analyzed, including beans, which is an essential staple good for Mexican
families. In addition, estimates of the effect on prices are negative, but this decrease
in prices was not enough to maintain the consumption of the families.
The Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN) program provides food to families
affected and supports the reconstruction of the infrastructure in the affected areas.
In addition, the Mexican Government received US$200,000 from the Inter-American
Development Bank to purchase food for the affected families. Yet, our results indicate
that this aid was not enough to protect the consumption of families who were affected.
De Janvry, et al. (2016) find evidence that this program (FONDEN) increases local
economic activity between 2 and 4 percent in the year following the disaster. Thus,
this program can be an important factor mitigating the effects of natural disaster in
the medium term. Yet, it is necessary that the program review whether the quan-
tity, quality, and periodicity with which food is distributed are the most appropriate.
Improving these factors potentially can help to smooth the consumption of families
affected in the short term.
79
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics Assets: Puebla
Variables Treatment Control Difference
Number of members of the HH 4.67 4.09 0.58∗∗∗
Computer 0.02 0.28 −0.26∗∗∗
Stove 0.44 0.95 −0.51∗∗∗
Washing machine 0.04 0.54 −0.50∗∗∗
Refrigerator 0.26 0.74 −0.48∗∗∗
DVD 0.23 0.40 −0.17∗∗∗
TV 0.55 0.89 −0.34∗∗∗
Water heater 0.16 0.44 −0.28∗∗∗
Cellphone 0.30 0.66 −0.36∗∗∗
Microwave 0.02 0.20 −0.18∗∗∗
Toaster 0.00 0.12 −0.12∗∗∗
Internet 0.01 0.25 −0.24∗∗∗
Piped water 0.85 0.56 0.29∗∗∗
Toilet inside hh 0.71 0.86 −0.15∗∗∗
Electricity 0.98 0.99 −0.01
Landline 0.21 0.32 −0.11∗∗∗
Cable TV 0.17 0.22 −0.05∗
Car 0.05 0.28 −0.23∗∗∗
Number of observations 328 334
Note: Tlaola and Huauchinango are treatment municipalities while Palmar de Bravo and Juan
C. Bonilla form the comparison group. Clustered standard errors at the street level.
Source: Survey of Social Mobility in Disaster Zones.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Pre-Hurricane Responses Regarding Consumption (Puebla)
Did your household consume...? How much...?
No answer No Yes Answer
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Corn tortilla 1.9 8.5 89.5 100.0
Bean 2.7 10.9 86.3 100.0
Tomato 1.8 1.6 96.5 100.0
Lemon 2.5 23.3 74.1 99.6
Banana 2.3 19.0 78.7 100.0
Sugar 1.8 3.4 94.8 99.7
Beef 2.1 24.4 73.5 99.6
Chicken 1.9 7.9 90.1 99.8
Eggs 2.1 10.9 86.9 99.7
Milk 2.3 28.4 69.3 99.8
Alcohol 1.9 90.9 7.2 93.8
Cigarettes 1.9 95.4 2.7 100.0
Note: Data combined for treatment and control group.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics Consumption: Puebla (Pre-Hurricane)
Variables Treatment Control Difference
Corn tortilla 0.75 0.91 −0.16∗∗∗
Bean 0.89 0.88 0.01
Tomato 0.99 0.98 −0.01
Lemon 0.63 0.75 −0.12∗∗∗
Banana 0.90 0.80 0.10∗∗∗
Sugar 0.99 0.96 0.03∗∗
Beef 0.96 0.75 0.21∗∗∗
Chicken 0.96 0.91 0.04∗∗∗
Eggs 0.92 0.88 0.04∗∗
Milk 0.70 0.69 0.01
Alcohol 0.24 0.14 0.10∗∗∗
Cigarettes 0.01 0.03 0.02∗∗
Note: Tlaola and Huauchinango are treatment municipalities while Palmar de Bravo and Juan
C. Bonilla form the comparison group. Clustered standard errors at the street level.
Source: Survey of Social Mobility in Disaster Zones
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics Quantities Consumed per Household: Puebla (Pre-
Hurricane)
Variables Treatment Control Difference
Corn tortilla 4.32 6.98 −2.66∗∗∗
Bean 1.40 1.83 −0.43∗∗∗
Tomato 1.87 2.84 −0.97∗∗∗
Lemon 0.71 1.29 −0.58∗∗∗
Banana 2.02 1.75 0.27∗∗
Sugar 2.57 1.92 0.65∗∗∗
Beef 1.09 1.09 0.00
Chicken 1.20 1.59 −0.39∗∗∗
Eggs 1.16 1.41 −0.25∗∗
Milk 1.54 3.76 −2.21∗∗∗
Alcohol 0.16 0.08 0.08∗∗∗
Cigarettes 0.01 0.06 −0.05∗∗
Note: Tlaola and Huauchinango are treatment municipalities while Palmar de Bravo and Juan
C. Bonilla form the comparison group. Clustered standard errors at the street level.
Source: Survey of Social Mobility in Disaster Zones
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics Prices: Puebla (Pre-Hurricane)
Variables Treatment Control Difference
Corn tortilla 9.89 8.99 0.90∗∗∗
Bean 25.91 19.37 6.54∗∗∗
Tomato 13.32 10.71 2.61∗∗∗
Lemon 11.47 9.10 2.37∗∗∗
Banana 9.59 8.31 1.27∗∗∗
Sugar 19.04 14.08 4.95∗∗
Beef 54.74 66.87 −12.13∗∗∗
Chicken 43.70 43.10 0.59
Eggs 18.92 20.78 −1.85∗∗
Milk 13.08 11.00 2.08∗∗∗
Alcohol 9.06 15.83 −6.77∗∗∗
Cigarettes 31.50 44.63 −13.13∗
Note: Chicahuaxtla (Tlaola) and Xaltepec (Huauchinango) are treatment municipalities while
Palmar de Bravo and Juan C. Bonilla form the comparison group. Clustered standard errors
at the street level.
Source: Survey of Social Mobility in Disaster Zones.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of the Hurricane on Food
Consumption and Prices
Consumption Quantity Price
Variables Mean Estimate Mean Quantity Mean Price
Tortillas 0.739 −0.003 4.752 −0.030 9.908 −0.944∗∗∗
0.439 (0.005) 5.323 (0.068) 0.871 (0.104)
Beans 0.902 −0.140∗∗∗ 1.514 −0.288∗∗∗ 25.927 −1.911∗∗∗
0.298 (0.023) 2.129 (0.099) 9.041 (0.523)
Tomatoes 0.995 −0.003 2.098 −0.009 13.374 −3.520∗∗∗
0.068 (0.005) 1.771 (0.041) 4.388 (0.435)
Lemon 0.650 −0.056∗∗∗ 0.770 −0.068 11.574 −1.689∗∗∗
0.477 (0.018) 1.006 (0.044) 6.367 (0.432)
Plantain 0.917 −0.020 2.096 −0.075 9.572 −1.336∗∗∗
0.275 (0.013) 1.310 (0.056) 3.496 (0.330)
Sugar 0.996 −0.040∗∗ 2.776 −0.183 18.959 −0.533
0.063 (0.017) 2.564 (0.130) 8.075 (0.404)
Alcohol 0.240 0.011 0.164 −0.009 9.247 −12.739∗
0.427 (0.030) 0.384 (0.028) 7.496 (6.748)
Cigarretts 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 31.500 15.636∗∗
0.072 (0.008) 0.072 (0.031) 6.949 (5.661)
Beef 0.974 −0.023∗∗ 1.141 0.023 55.195 −4.867∗∗∗
0.160 (0.012) 0.568 (0.032) 11.519 (0.901)
Chicken 0.974 −0.018∗∗ 1.254 0.025 43.832 −4.340∗∗∗
0.158 (0.009) 0.646 (0.031) 6.734 (0.606)
Eggs 0.951 −0.003 1.276 −0.025 18.917 −1.098∗∗∗
0.216 (0.017) 1.023 (0.034) 5.362 (0.339)
Milk 0.707 −0.001 1.664 −0.028 13.262 −0.173
0.455 (0.013) 1.901 (0.069) 6.703 (0.198)
Note: Clustered standard errors displayed in parenthesis at the street level. The
table displays for each outcome the mean outcome for the treatment group be-
fore the hurricane, and the interaction term between the treatment and the after
dummy. The sample size for consumption ranges from 1,291 for milk to 1,307 for
tortillas. In the case of the quantities, it ranges from 1,287 for alcohol to 1,308 for
tomatoes. Finally, in the case of prices, it ranges from 889 for lemons to 1,306 for
beef, with the exceptions of alcohol (164) and cigarettes (22).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.7: Matching Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Impact of the Hurricane
on Food Consumption and Prices
Consumption Quantity Price
Variables Mean Estimate Mean Quantity Mean Price
Tortillas 0.739 −0.008 4.752 −0.067 9.908 −0.852∗∗∗
0.439 (0.009) 5.323 (0.092) 0.871 (0.106)
Beans 0.902 −0.153∗∗∗ 1.514 −0.298∗∗ 25.927 −1.355∗∗
0.298 (0.027) 2.129 (0.124) 9.041 (0.562)
Tomatoes 0.995 −0.002 2.098 −0.016 13.374 −3.139∗∗∗
0.068 (0.007) 1.771 (0.043) 4.388 (0.541)
Lemon 0.650 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.770 −0.094∗∗ 11.574 −0.932∗∗
0.477 (0.015) 1.006 (0.039) 6.367 (0.446)
Plantain 0.917 −0.025 2.096 −0.063 9.572 −1.016∗∗∗
0.275 (0.015) 1.310 (0.051) 3.496 (0.376)
Sugar 0.996 −0.044∗∗∗ 2.776 −0.219 18.959 −0.022
0.063 (0.016) 2.564 (0.144) 8.075 (0.487)
Alcohol 0.240 −0.005 0.164 −0.004 9.247 −10.081∗
0.427 (0.031) 0.384 (0.028) 7.496 (5.266)
Cigarretts 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.015 31.500 20.836∗∗∗
0.072 (0.009) 0.072 (0.012) 6.949 (6.495)
Beef 0.974 −0.032∗∗ 1.141 0.004 55.195 −4.311∗∗∗
0.160 (0.015) 0.568 (0.031) 11.519 (1.270)
Chicken 0.974 −0.023∗∗ 1.254 0.016 43.832 −4.169∗∗∗
0.158 (0.011) 0.646 (0.034) 6.734 (0.740)
Eggs 0.951 −0.008 1.276 −0.010 18.917 −1.596∗∗∗
0.216 (0.014) 1.023 (0.037) 5.362 (0.496)
Milk 0.707 −0.009 1.664 −0.039 13.262 0.006
0.455 (0.013) 1.901 (0.085) 6.703 (0.284)
Note: Clustered standard errors displayed in parenthesis. The table displays for
each outcome the mean outcome for the treatment group before the hurricane, and
the interaction term between the treatment and the after dummy. The difference-
in-differences estimator include fixed effects at the street level. The sample size for
consumption ranges from 1,291 for milk to 1,307 for tortillas. In the case of the
quantities, it ranges from 1,287 for alcohol to 1,308 for tomatoes. Finally, in the
case of prices, it ranges from 889 for lemons to 1,306 for beef, with the exceptions
of alcohol (164) and cigarettes (22).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.8: Municipality Fixed Effect Estimates of the Impact of the Hurricane on
Food Consumption and Prices
Consumption Quantity Price
Variables Mean Estimate Mean Quantity Mean Price
Tortillas 0.739 −0.003 4.752 −0.032 9.908 −0.944∗∗∗
0.439 (0.005) 5.323 (0.068) 0.871 (0.105)
Beans 0.902 −0.140∗∗∗ 1.514 −0.293∗∗∗ 25.927 −2.080∗∗∗
0.298 (0.023) 2.129 (0.099) 9.041 (0.496)
Tomatoes 0.995 −0.003 2.098 −0.009 13.374 −3.531∗∗∗
0.068 (0.005) 1.771 (0.041) 4.388 (0.436)
Lemon 0.650 −0.057∗∗∗ 0.770 −0.068 11.574 −1.742∗∗∗
0.477 (0.018) 1.006 (0.045) 6.367 (0.434)
Plantain 0.917 −0.020 2.096 −0.073 9.572 −1.331∗∗∗
0.275 (0.013) 1.310 (0.056) 3.496 (0.329)
Sugar 0.996 −0.040∗∗ 2.776 −0.185 18.959 −0.483
0.063 (0.017) 2.564 (0.131) 8.075 (0.401)
Alcohol 0.240 0.011 0.164 −0.009 9.247 −12.264∗
0.427 (0.031) 0.384 (0.028) 7.496 (6.674)
Cigarretts 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 31.500 15.804∗∗
0.072 (0.008) 0.072 (0.031) 6.949 (5.871)
Beef 0.974 −0.024∗∗ 1.141 0.022 55.195 −4.837∗∗∗
0.160 (0.012) 0.568 (0.032) 11.519 (0.898)
Chicken 0.974 −0.018∗∗ 1.254 0.025 43.832 −4.336∗∗∗
0.158 (0.009) 0.646 (0.031) 6.734 (0.603)
Eggs 0.951 −0.002 1.276 −0.024 18.917 −1.096∗∗∗
0.216 (0.017) 1.023 (0.034) 5.362 (0.339)
Milk 0.707 −0.003 1.664 −0.030 13.262 −0.170
0.455 (0.013) 1.901 (0.071) 6.703 (0.196)
Note: Clustered standard errors displayed in parenthesis at the street level. The
table displays for each outcome the mean outcome for the treatment group be-
fore the hurricane, and the interaction term between the treatment and the after
dummy. The estimator include fixed effects at the municipality level. The sample
size for consumption ranges from 1,291 for milk to 1,307 for tortillas. In the case
of the quantities, it ranges from 1,287 for alcohol to 1,308 for tomatoes. Finally,
in the case of prices, it ranges from 889 for lemons to 1,306 for beef, with the
exceptions of alcohol (164) and cigarettes (22).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.9: Difference-in-Difference Estimates on Aggregated Consumption
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Total Consumption w/o Quantity w/o
Consumption Alcohol and Cigarettes Alcohol and Cigarettes
After -0.153*** -0.021 -0.164
(0.044) (0.034) (0.138)
Treatment 0.705* 0.562 -6.275***
(0.401) (0.363) (0.996)
After*Treatment -0.302*** -0.314*** -0.581**
(0.071) (0.063) (0.264)
Constant 9.576*** 9.510*** 24.049***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.780)
Observations 1,324 1,324 1,324
R-squared 0.184 0.187 0.075
Note: Clustered standard errors displayed in parenthesis at the street
level. For the case of milk, it is assumed that 1kg= 1 liter.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.10: Heterogenous Estimates on Food Consumption
Consumption Quantity
Variables Mean Estimate Mean Quantity
Tortillas 0.748 0.032 4.322 0.013
0.435 (0.021) 4.980 (0.181)
Beans 0.899 0.014 1.401 0.033
0.302 (0.025) 2.024 (0.056)
Tomatoes 0.994 0.003 1.873 −0.053
0.078 (0.004) 1.524 (0.047)
Lemon 0.635 −0.034 0.710 0.036
0.482 (0.021) 0.908 (0.037)
Plantain 0.908 0.019 2.029 −0.056
0.290 (0.013) 1.317 (0.050)
Sugar 0.994 0.016 2.571 0.065
0.078 (0.014) 2.365 (0.046)
Alcohol 0.240 −0.010 0.162 −0.029
0.428 (0.018) 0.381 (0.025)
Cigarrettes 0.006 −0.006 0.006 −0.026
0.078 (0.004) 0.078 (0.021)
Beef 0.966 0.029∗∗ 1.097 −0.002
0.181 (0.012) 0.577 (0.047)
Chicken 0.966 0.005 1.200 −0.048∗
0.181 (0.009) 0.640 (0.029)
Eggs 0.929 0.009 1.164 −0.035
0.256 (0.013) 0.908 (0.028)
Milk 0.693 −0.003 1.548 −0.072
0.462 (0.019) 1.792 (0.079)
Note: Clustered standard errors displayed in paren-
thesis at the street level. The table displays for each
outcome the mean outcome for the treatment group
before the hurricane, and the interaction term between
the treatment, the after dummy, and index of wealth.
The sample size for consumption ranges from 1,291 for
milk to 1,307 for tortillas. In the case of the quantities,
it ranges from 1,287 for alcohol to 1,308 for tomatoes.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A1: Latent Variable Scales
Scale Name Scale Survey Question Factor
Loadings
Bullying [1] Other students bother me (pulling hair, throwing objects, etc.) 0.3948
Eigenvalue: 2.9 [2] Other students called me bad names 0.4499
[3] Other students left me out of an activity intentionally 0.4596
[4] Other students threatened to hurt me 0.4686
[5] I was beaten or kicked 0.4592
Self-esteem [1] I am satisfied with myself 0.3678
Eigenvalue: 2.1 [2] I am able to do things as well as others 0.4358
[3] I am a worthy person 0.4845
[4] I have good qualities 0.4720
[5] I have a positive attitude toward myself 0.4661
Authoritative Parents [1] My parents make show me how much they love me 0.4651
Eigenvalue: 2.8 [2] My parents explain to me the consequences of my misconduct 0.4444
[3] My parents encourage me to say what I feel when I disagree 0.4443
[4] My parents reason with me when I misbehave 0.4441
[5] My parents know my concerns 0.4400
Family Support [1] My family recognizes what I do well 0.4295
Eigenvalue: 3.5 [2] My family really tries to help me 0.4593
[3] My family helps me make decisions 0.4449
[4] My family supports me when I need them 0.4648
[5] My family is affectionate with me 0.4365
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Table A2: OLS Estimates: Effects of Bullying on whether Adolescents Dropped Out
of School
(OLS) (Probit) (Logit)
Dep Var: Dropping Out
Bullying 0.049∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.054) (0.094)
Father died 0.205∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.257) (0.444)
Mother died 0.173 0.818∗ 1.531∗
(0.107) (0.469) (0.794)
Parent in Prison 0.003 0.029 0.040
(0.057) (0.290) (0.521)
Sex (Female=1) -0.015 -0.060 -0.063
(0.023) (0.123) (0.221)
Siblings 0.029∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.036) (0.065)
Siblings Older -0.004 -0.016 -0.028
(0.007) (0.035) (0.061)
Age 0.464 4.557∗∗ 9.713∗∗∗
(0.329) (1.840) (3.442)
Age squared -0.014 -0.143∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.063) (0.117)
Constant -3.816 -37.389∗∗∗ -78.509∗∗∗
(2.377) (13.451) (25.256)
Municipality Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table B1: Balancing Test Before and After the Matching
Covariates Treatment Control p > |t|
Computer Unmatched 0.018 0.281 0.000
Matched 0.018 0.019 0.933
Stove Unmatched 0.443 0.949 0.000
Matched 0.442 0.391 0.193
Washing machine Unmatched 0.043 0.536 0.000
Matched 0.043 0.050 0.655
Refrigerator Unmatched 0.257 0.740 0.000
Matched 0.258 0.241 0.631
DVD Unmatched 0.232 0.401 0.000
Matched 0.233 0.137 0.002
TV Unmatched 0.554 0.892 0.000
Matched 0.555 0.605 0.202
Water heater Unmatched 0.162 0.443 0.000
Matched 0.163 0.257 0.003
Cellphone Unmatched 0.303 0.665 0.000
Matched 0.304 0.232 0.037
Microwave Unmatched 0.024 0.201 0.000
Matched 0.025 0.019 0.656
Toaster Unmatched 0.003 0.120 0.000
Matched 0.003 0.005 0.731
Internet Unmatched 0.009 0.251 0.000
Matched 0.009 0.007 0.749
Piped water Unmatched 0.847 0.563 0.000
Matched 0.847 0.797 0.097
Toilet inside hh Unmatched 0.713 0.862 0.000
Matched 0.712 0.809 0.004
Electricity Unmatched 0.982 0.988 0.503
Matched 0.982 0.979 0.803
Landline Unmatched 0.208 0.320 0.001
Matched 0.209 0.141 0.023
Cable TV Unmatched 0.168 0.225 0.069
Matched 0.169 0.214 0.138
102
